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POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGE, MONOGAMOUS 
DIVORCE 
MICHAEL J. HIGDON† 
ABSTRACT 
 Could the constitutional right to marry also encompass polygamy? 
That question, which has long intrigued legal scholars, has taken on 
even greater significance in the wake of Obergefell v. Hodges. This 
Article answers that question in a novel way by scrutinizing the practice 
of plural marriage through the lens of economic game theory, exploring 
the extreme harms that would befall the state should polygamy become 
law. More specifically, the Article delves into the ex ante consequences 
of legalization, not on practicing polygamists (as is typically the focus), 
but on sequential bigamists—that is, those who never intend to have 
more than one spouse at any given time but who nonetheless marry 
more than one person in their lifetime. The Article concludes that the 
state has a compelling economic interest in limiting marriage to two 
people. If polygamy were to become the law of the land, states could no 
longer prohibit bigamy. In turn, separating couples would lose one of 
the strongest incentives they currently have to choose formal divorce 
proceedings over the seemingly simpler option of mutual desertion: the 
threat of criminal charges for bigamy. In essence, a sequential bigamist 
could then marry multiple times in his lifetime without ever divorcing 
and, at the same time, without risking a criminal charge of bigamy. 
Such actions—dubbed “sequential polygamy”—would compromise 
the state’s interest in protecting its citizens from financial harms. After 
all, divorce proceedings provide the state with an opportunity to 
intercede into the process, thereby obtaining some assurance that those 
who are leaving a marriage are not doing so at their financial peril. 
With the legalization of polygamy, however, bigamy becomes a thing 
of the past, eroding the state’s ability to encourage divorce as a means 
of safeguarding the health and safety of its citizens. Most concerning is 
the impact this change would have on those living in poverty—the 
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people likely to be hardest hit by any societal shift away from formal 
divorce. Finally, any attempts by the state to distinguish between 
bigamy and polygamy (for example, by permitting plural marriage but 
only if all spouses consent), would fail to ameliorate the resulting harm 
to its citizens. 
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Law often amounts to a substitute for trust in situations too complex or 
dispersed for trust to arise. 
—Ward Farnsworth1 
INTRODUCTION 
Within the United States, marriage is and always has been limited 
 
 1. WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR THINKING ABOUT THE 
LAW 103 (2008). 
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to two people.2 Somewhat ironic, then, is the understanding that every 
marriage is, in actuality, comprised of three parties—the third being 
the state.3 That the state would play such an involved role should come 
as little surprise, however, given the state’s “interest in preserving the 
integrity of marriages and in safeguarding family relationships.”4 That 
interest is particularly acute when it comes to divorce. As one court 
aptly explained, “[s]ince marriage is of vital interest to society and the 
state . . . in every divorce suit the state is a third party whose interests 
take precedence over the private interests of the spouses.”5 Quite simply, 
because “[d]ivorce, by its very nature, is likely to result in some social 
and financial harm to one or both parties,”6 the state is very much 
concerned with watching out for and protecting those going through 
the process of marital dissolution. In fact, divorce proceedings are 
designed and structured primarily to permit the state to oversee the 
process, thus enabling the state to better “protect each of the parties 
and their conflicting interests.”7 In order to play that crucial role, 
however, the state must first insure that its citizens elect to end their 
marriages through formal divorce proceedings, as opposed to the more 
informal option of simply deserting one another. 
It is helpful at the outset to understand how and why the state 
incentivizes individuals to divorce, particularly since this Article 
ultimately concludes that legalizing polygamy would undermine the 
 
 2. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR. & ANN LAQUER ESTIN, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS 114 (2005) (“It goes without saying that monogamy is the controlling 
principle of Anglo-American marriage law.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003) (“In a real 
sense, there are three partners to every civil marriage: two willing spouses and an approving 
State.”); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 13 (N.Y. 2006) (Graffeo, J., concurring) (recognizing 
that “[t]here are, in effect, three parties to every marriage, the man, the woman and the State.” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Fearon v. Treanor, 5 N.E.2d 815, 816 (1936))); Fricke v. Fricke, 
42 N.W.2d 500, 501 (Wis. 1950) (“There are three parties to a marriage contract—the husband, 
the wife, and the state.”). 
 4. MARK STRASSER, LEGALLY WED: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 125 
(1997). 
 5. Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 383 (Fla. 1970) (emphasis added); see also Manion v. 
Manion, 363 A.2d 921, 923 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1976) (“Our Supreme Court has said . . . ‘in every suit 
for divorce the State is in fact if not in name a third party having a substantial interest.’” (quoting 
In re Backes, 109 A.2d 273, 275 (1954))); Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500, 505 (Ohio 1984) (noting 
that the “state is virtually a party to every marital contract in that it possesses a continuing concern 
in the financial security of divorced or separated persons”). 
 6. Gale Humphrey Carpenter, Comment, Protecting the Privacy of Divorcing Parties: The 
Move Toward Pseudonymous Filing, 17 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 105, 113 (2001). 
 7. LENARD MARLOW & S. RICHARD SAUBER, THE HANDBOOK OF DIVORCE MEDIATION 
89 (1990); see infra Part III. 
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state’s ability to effectively incentivize that choice. To explain how the 
state incentivizes this choice, it is helpful to look to the example of the 
prisoner’s dilemma. The prisoner’s dilemma is an often-used example 
of a collective action problem.8 The setup is that two prisoners, each 
suspected of working with the other to commit a serious crime, are 
isolated from one another and given two choices. The first is to confess 
to the joint enterprise, and the second is to keep silent. If both prisoners 
keep silent, each will be sentenced to one year in prison. If both 
confess, implicating one another, each prisoner will receive a sentence 
of five years. If, however, one confesses and the other remains silent, 
the prisoner who confesses will go free while the prisoner who refuses 
to speak will receive a sentence of ten years. 
An interesting dilemma thus presents itself—neither prisoner 
knows what the other is going to do and, accordingly, when it comes 
time for each to decide whether to confess or remain silent, it is unclear 
which action would be most beneficial. The most mutually beneficial 
option is for both to keep silent, which will result in a sentence of one 
year for each prisoner; however, if one suspects that the other plans to 
remain silent, then he would, in turn, be tempted to confess. After all, 
if he confesses but his partner in crime does not, then he is set free. But 
if both fall prey to this same temptation and both confess, then they 
each get five years—four years more than if they had simply kept 
quiet.9 
As illustrated by the prisoner’s dilemma, failure to cooperate can 
result (at least from the perspective of the two prisoners) in aggregate 
waste—a result that, as any legal economist can attest, the law abhors.10 
For that reason, the law actively seeks to encourage cooperation 
 
 8. The prisoner’s dilemma is particularly popular within the realm of economic game 
theory—an area described as “an amalgam of economics, mathematics, and other sciences, the 
purpose of which is to shed light on strategic interaction.” FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 101; see 
also GRAHAM ROMP, GAME THEORY: INTRODUCTION AND APPLICATIONS 1 (1997) (“Game 
theory is concerned with how rational individuals make decisions when they are mutually 
interdependent.”). 
 9. Quite a few variations of the prisoner’s dilemma exist. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class 
Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1372 n.105 (1995); 
Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality 
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1138–39 (2000). 
 10. See Finney Cty. Water Users’ Ass’n v. Graham Ditch Co., 1 F.2d 650, 652 (D. Colo. 1924) 
(“As a general principle, equity abhors waste, and delights to restrain it in a proper case.”); Saul 
Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65, 72 (1985) (“Applying the notion of economic 
efficiency to tort and contract law often involves a search for the party best able to control a 
situation: legal liability is imposed to induce that party to minimize waste.”). 
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between parties to achieve efficient, mutually beneficial results.11 The 
law does this in two ways: by incentivizing ex ante agreements and, for 
those who need extra motivation to cooperate, by threatening 
punishment for noncooperation. The hypothetical prisoners in the 
prisoner’s dilemma, for instance, would not have found themselves in 
that particular quandary had they been permitted to talk with one 
another ahead of time and make an enforceable agreement not to 
confess. To avoid this inefficiency, the law encourages ex ante 
agreement via contracts,12 but it simultaneously uses the threat of ex 
post punishment, like the legal penalties found in tort and criminal 
law,13 to further encourage cooperation. The theory is that the fear of 
sanction will provide the requisite motivation to cooperate. 
While the law is sometimes used to promote cooperation and 
defuse prisoner’s dilemmas, other times it is used to affirmatively foster 
new dilemmas in order to steer parties away from cooperation deemed 
harmful to societal interests.14 The focus in discussing the prisoner’s 
dilemma has thus far been on what decision would be most beneficial 
from the perspective of the two prisoners, but the hypothetical is not 
quite that simple. The prisoner’s dilemma, just like marriage, also 
involves the interests of a third party, and that third party is the state. 
After all, the prisoner’s dilemma presents a situation in which society 
would prefer that the parties not cooperate. Indeed, if each prisoner 
truly is guilty, punishing both with prison sentences would likely be in 
society’s best interest. As a result, the societal benefit of disallowing 
cooperation between the prisoners heavily outweighs any benefit such 
cooperation would bring the individual parties.  
The law recognizes that cooperation is not always desirable for 
 
 11. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 15 (2002) (“The law encourages 
cooperation in many ways.”); Raymond H. Brescia, Trust in the Shadows: Law, Behavior, and 
Financial Re-Regulation, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1361, 1405 (2009) (“[L]aw can help encourage the 
initial cooperative move that is so important for encouraging trusting and cooperative 
behavior.”).  
 12. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 102 (“Contracts allow people to limit their options if 
others will limit their own in return; they give everyone a convenient way to beat prisoner’s 
dilemmas and enjoy the gains that come from cooperation.”). 
 13. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Bargaining Analysis of American Labor Law and the Search 
for Bargaining Equity and Industrial Peace, 91 MICH. L. REV. 419, 494 (1992) (“[T]he law relies 
both on prohibitions of strategic behavior and on measures designed to encourage the parties to 
achieve the cooperative solution themselves.”). 
 14. See GARY W. COX & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN: PARTY 
GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE 84 (2d ed. 2007) (“In many cases, of course, action can be taken to 
create prisoner’s dilemmas. Examples include the District Attorney’s separation of the suspects 
in the original prisoner’s dilemma, antitrust laws, and open shop laws.”). 
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society at large, and in such instances, the law can instead “try to 
structure their incentives to destroy that possibility.”15 Antitrust laws, 
for example, target an area of “unwanted cooperation” involving 
“business rivals who get together in smoky hotel rooms and fix the 
prices of their wares.”16 Given the harms that would flow from such 
practices, “[t]he purpose of antitrust laws is to instead force them into 
separate rooms, figuratively speaking, so they will do the individually 
rational thing, which is to compete vigorously.”17 
In fact, the law is replete with mechanisms that make it rational 
for individuals to eschew options that might appear more self-serving 
and instead elect options that ultimately benefit the larger group.18 At 
the heart of this Article lies one such mechanism: the financial 
protections provided to divorcing spouses under the law of divorce. To 
understand how divorce operates in that manner, consider the two 
options before a married couple who has decided to permanently part 
ways. They could simply agree to divide their property informally 
between themselves, go their separate ways, and just pretend as though 
the marriage never took place. If both remained silent about the fact 
that they never divorced, it is unlikely that either would ever be 
penalized or even caught.19 Alternatively, they can formally divorce, 
 
 15. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 108. Game theory, once again, can help to understand 
the process of determining which laws will incentivize cooperation and which will prevent it. See, 
e.g., Farrukh B. Akeem, Sports Related Crime: A Game Theory Approach, in MATCH-FIXING IN 
INTERNATIONAL SPORTS: EXISTING PROCESSES, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PREVENTION 
STRATEGIES 247, 253 (M.R. Haberfeld & Dale Sheehan eds., 2013) (“Game theory enables the 
government to predict which laws will encourage cooperation among parties, and also the laws 
that will disincentivize cooperation.”). 
 16. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 108; see also John K. Setear, Note, Discovery Abuse 
Under the Federal Rules: Causes and Cures, 92 YALE L.J. 352, 371 n.101 (1982) (“Where a 
complicated case involves two parties with substantial resources, the Prisoner’s Dilemma [sic] is 
therefore especially acute.”). 
 17. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 108. See generally John Shepard Wiley Jr., Reciprocal 
Altruism as a Felony: Antitrust and the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1906 (1988) 
(discussing antitrust laws in the context of the prisoner’s dilemma). 
 18. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 103 (“We’re all better off if nobody steals . . . than if 
everyone does; but that may not be enough to get each of us not to do those things when we 
privately decide for ourselves. Conscience is a help then, but perhaps not as convincing as the 
threat of coercion.”); see also Erin Ann O’Hara & Douglas Yarn, On Apology and Consilience, 
77 WASH. L. REV. 1121, 1130 n.31 (2002) (“The Prisoner’s Dilemma disregards ethical 
considerations; it is simply rational to be selfish in this moral vacuum whenever the temptation to 
defect exceeds the benefits of cooperation.”). 
 19. See, e.g., ANN LAQUER ESTIN, DOMESTIC RELATIONSHIPS: A CONTEMPORARY 
APPROACH 113 (2013) (“[R]ules against bigamy are not enforced very often. Criminal 
prosecutions are rare, . . . [and] [o]n the civil side, various doctrines dilute the force of the 
monogamy principle.”); see also infra Part III.B (discussing the civil doctrines designed to 
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which entails potentially significant expense, emotional stress, and 
perhaps even societal stigma.20 When presented that way, the choice 
appears rather simple. The law of domestic relations, however, actively 
encourages couples to select the more onerous option of formal 
divorce, and it does so in a number of ways: through property-based 
incentives and, should those incentives fail, the threat of criminal 
prosecutions for bigamy. 
First are the property-based incentives. Regardless of whatever 
settlement the parties might informally work out between themselves, 
each party would likely believe that the formalities and procedures that 
accompany a court-supervised divorce proceeding could benefit either 
or both parties. First, hiring a divorce attorney, who is a personal 
advocate and a family law expert, might result in a more beneficial 
outcome.21 Second, because divorce settlements are ultimately 
reviewed by courts for fairness, even parties that are not represented 
by counsel could be awarded a better deal than would be struck outside 
court.22 Finally, even for a wealthier spouse who potentially has more 
to lose, divorce is nonetheless an attractive option because it provides 
finality, in that it extinguishes any claim a former spouse would have to 
property that the wealthier spouse might acquire in the future.23 Thus, 
regardless of the parties’ financial interests, the law incentivizes 
separating couples to pursue formal divorce proceedings. 
Such property-based incentives, however, are unlikely to have 
much influence on those divorcing couples who lack significant marital 
property. This reduced incentive may explain why poorer individuals, 
although more likely to separate, are nonetheless less likely to divorce.24 
 
ameliorate the harms caused by bigamy). 
 20. See ELIZABETH BRAKE, MINIMIZING MARRIAGE: MARRIAGE, MORALITY, AND THE 
LAW 56 (2012) (noting that “marriage is distinguished by the scope of its penalties—legal, 
economic, social, and moral”). 
 21. See, e.g., Emily S. Taylor Poppe & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Do Lawyers Matter? The Effect 
of Legal Representation in Civil Disputes, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 881, 922–23 (2016) (summarizing 
studies that found “that legal representation for a plaintiff was associated with an increase in the 
odds of an award of alimony or support”). 
 22. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 23. Alicia Brokars Kelly, The Marital Partnership Pretense and Career Assets: The 
Ascendency of Self over the Marital Community, 81 B.U. L. REV. 59, 100 (2001) (“[P]roperty 
acquired after divorce is considered separate property to which an ex-spouse has no claim.”). 
 24. Jesse H. Choper, Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding Individual 
Constitutional Rights, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1, 150–51 (1984) (“[A]lthough the bottom economic 
groups produce the highest separation rates, they also show very low divorce rates, thus giving 
inferential support to the intuitive conclusion that many poor people who desire a divorce simply 
cannot afford one.”).  
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As one commentator explains, “One not so uncommon American story 
is that of the man who marries, deserts his wife without judicial 
dissolution of the marriage, and then takes a new wife.”25 And of 
particular significance to the state is the fact that “[t]he story most often 
occurs within the lower socioeconomic strata of society—the societal 
group whose widowed women are most apt to become welfare 
recipients.”26 Thus, the state, in light of its “substantial interest in the 
economic and social welfare of its members,”27 requires a more 
practical, non-property-based incentive to more fully incentivize 
formal divorce. 
Criminal law provides such a non-property-based incentive. No 
person may legally have more than one spouse.28 Thus, a married 
couple who decides to separate must first divorce before either can 
remarry. Theoretically, either could take a chance and remarry without 
first getting a divorce, but doing so would expose that person to a 
potential charge of bigamy.29 More importantly, such action would put 
the subsequent spouse in a precarious financial situation.30 Specifically, 
that person’s subsequent “spouse” would be denied the benefits and 
protections of marriage should the subsequent marriage ultimately be 
declared bigamous and, thus, void. Indeed, it is because of the states’ 
interest in protecting spouses—both former and subsequent—that the 
law, predominantly through rules against bigamy, attempts to 
encourage separating couples to elect divorce.31 After all, because 
divorce proceedings require the participation of the state, divorce 
actions assist the state in obtaining assurances that its citizens’ 
economic interests are being safeguarded. 
 
 25. E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., Repeal of the Presumption of the Validity of Subsequent Marriages: 
Another Irrational Step Toward Increasing the Welfare Roles, 21 MERCER L. REV. 465, 465 (1970). 
 26. Id.; see also infra notes 196–98 and accompanying text. 
 27. Taylor, supra note 25, at 467; see also infra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 28. See ESTIN, supra note 19, at 113 (“Monogamy is the controlling principle of Anglo-
American marriage law: a person may have only one spouse at a time.”); Taylor, supra note 25, 
at 467 (“The more direct criminal bigamy prosecution would seem to be the law’s most 
appropriate implement for this purpose.”). 
 29. See ROBERT L. MADDEX, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND THE LAW 36 
(2006) (noting that “[b]igamy is a crime in all states and the District of Columbia, with little 
variation among these laws”). Further, bigamy is “generally considered a serious crime punished 
as a felony.” Id.  
 30. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 31. See, e.g., Maura Strassberg, The Crime of Polygamy, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 
353, 420 (2003) (characterizing the Model Penal Code’s definition of bigamy as, essentially, “the 
practice of entering into a second purportedly legal marriage without ever legally dissolving an 
unsuccessful first marriage” (emphasis added)). 
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States, of course, do not have unlimited authority when it comes 
to regulating marriage. Indeed, the Supreme Court has struck down a 
number of attempts by states to limit access to marriage.32 Most 
recently, the Court ruled in Obergefell v. Hodges33 that, under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, states cannot restrict 
marriage licenses to opposite-sex couples.34 Instead, same-sex couples 
must be granted access to marriage on the same terms as their opposite-
sex counterparts. That opinion raises the following question: whether 
other previously prohibited forms of marriage, including polygamy, 
must, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, likewise be 
recognized.35 Although currently quite rare in the United States, 
polygamy nonetheless exists—primarily in certain religious 
communities and in immigrant communities where polygamy is the 
traditional way of life.36 
In analyzing whether there is a constitutional right to enter into a 
polygamous marriage, scholars and commentators have taken 
positions on both sides of the argument and have used various 
rationales to do so.37 This Article takes a different approach. Looking 
at polygamy through the lens of law and economics, this Article 
concludes that, even if polygamy were included within the fundamental 
right to marriage, the states nonetheless have a compelling justification 
for continuing their refusal to recognize plural marriage: their 
 
 32. See infra Part II. 
 33. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 34. Id. at 2584, 2598. 
 35. See, e.g., Edward Stein, Plural Marriage, Group Marriage and Immutability in Obergefell 
v. Hodges and Beyond, 84 UMKC L. REV. 871, 871 (2016); Jonathan E. Amgott, Note, Post-
Windsor Prospects for Morals Legislation: The Case of Polygamous Immigrants, 26 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 513 passim (2015); Greggary E. Lines, Note, Polymmigration: Immigration 
Implications and Possibilities Post Brown v. Buhman, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 477, 478 (2016) (discussing 
a recent case in which “a polygamous family argued that Obergefell validated their application for 
a marriage license”).  
 36. See infra Part I. 
 37. See infra note 83 and accompanying text. One author wrote that: 
the right to control the number of persons in a marriage should not receive heightened 
scrutiny because the fundamental right to marry cannot be extended to a fundamental 
right to marry multiple persons. Therefore, courts should apply rational basis review to 
polygamy laws, and the states have more than adequate state interests to meet this level 
of scrutiny. 
Jonathan A. Porter, L’Amour For Four: Polygyny, Polyamory, and the State’s Compelling 
Economic Interest in Normative Monogamy, 64 EMORY L.J. 2093, 2138 (2015); see also Keith E. 
Sealing, Polygamists Out of the Closet: Statutory and State Constitutional Prohibitions Against 
Polygamy Are Unconstitutional Under the Free Exercise Clause, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 691, 748 
(2001) (“The right to marry is a fundamental right subject to the protection of strict scrutiny 
analysis, as a result of the close link between the right of marriage and the practice of religion.”). 
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substantial interest in promoting divorce among separating couples. If 
the Court were to rule that states could not limit marriages to two 
people, the consequences would be severe. From a deontological 
perspective, there would perhaps be fewer difficulties for those who 
actively and knowingly engage in polygamy.38 Under a consequentialist 
approach, however, the ex ante result of removing prohibitions against 
polygamy would be that nonpolygamous couples could agree to 
separate informally and later marry other people without any fear that 
they might be prosecuted for bigamy—“the criminal law under which 
polygamy is typically prosecuted”39—and also without any fear that 
their latest spouse would be denied the legal protections of marriage.40 
In other words, legalizing polygamy would eliminate one of the 
strongest incentives couples currently have to choose formal divorce. 
The result would be that divorcing couples, just like the prisoners in 
the prisoner’s dilemma, would be even more tempted to cooperate in 
 
 38. This conclusion is doubtful. Polygamy would likely create a number of issues, including 
child custody, property distribution at divorce, and intestate succession. Even more troubling are 
the concerns about how, in practice, legalized polygamy can become a mechanism for subjugating 
women. See SHEILA JEFFREYS, MAN’S DOMINION: THE RISE OF RELIGION AND THE ECLIPSE OF 
WOMEN’S RIGHTS 151 (2011) (“The harms of polygamy differ as to context, but reports from all 
forms of the practice, across both multicultural states and states where polygamy is a traditional 
practice, demonstrate severe harms to women and children.”). 
 39. Claire A. Smearman, Second Wives’ Club: Mapping the Impact of Polygamy in the U.S. 
Immigration Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 382, 383–84 (2009). Just as the law today uses the 
terms “bigamy” and “polygamy” as interchangeable, so too does this Article. See Marjorie A. 
Shields, Annotation, Validity of Bigamy and Polygamy Statutes and Constitutional Provisions, 22 
A.L.R.6th 1, § 2, at 6 (2007) (“[T]he terms bigamy and polygamy are now used interchangeably.”). 
It should be noted, however, that, in some instances, the law has attempted to use the terms in 
such a way that they refer to two distinct practices. Under the Model Penal Code, for instance, 
bigamy occurs when a “married person . . . contracts or purports to contract another marriage.” 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.1(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1980). In contrast, polygamy occurs if a person 
“marries or cohabits with more than one spouse at a time in purported exercise of the right of 
plural marriage.” Id. § 230.1(2).  
 40. In taking this approach, it is not the intent of this Article to wade into the debate about 
whether consequentialist arguments are appropriate when it comes to constitutional 
decisionmaking. See Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 411 (1990) 
(examining “two common understandings of legal pragmatism: pragmatism as forward-looking 
instrumentalism, and pragmatism as a hostility to abstract theory, formalism, and 
foundationalism”); see also Peter Brandon Bayer, Sacrifice and Sacred Honor: Why the 
Constitution is a “Suicide Pact,” 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 287, 293 (2011) (“[T]he 
fundamental dispute of whether principles must dominate, or are dominated by, consequences 
continues to fume among professed deontologists, avowed consequentialists and those who 
espouse hybrid approaches.”). Instead, it is my hope that even those who have been most critical 
of such an approach would nonetheless agree that it has merit in this context. See, e.g., Ronald 
Dworkin, Reply, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 432, 433 (1997) (“Of course, in some circumstances, pointing 
out that a doctrine will have surprising consequences—that a welfare program designed to help a 
particular group will actually harm that group, for example—is obviously immensely helpful.”). 
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an enterprise that, despite appearing more personally beneficial, is 
ultimately harmful to the larger society. That enterprise would be 
permanent separation—and perhaps even subsequent remarriage to a 
new spouse—without legally terminating the first marriage. In such 
situations, great harm could quite easily accrue to the first spouse, who 
never received a day in court to ensure fair treatment and equitable 
division of assets.41 Likewise, a subsequent spouse would be harmed by 
learning that the marriage was not, in fact, monogamous, and 
consequentially, that as merely one of several spouses, any property 
rights from the marriage are accordingly diluted.42 All of these harms 
would, in turn, significantly undermine the states’ interest in protecting 
the “communal health, comfort, and welfare”43 of their citizens—
“collective interests that no individual, acting alone, has the capacity to 
vindicate.”44 Finally, any attempts by the state to ameliorate those 
harms by crafting additional, more stringent requirements for plural 
marriage—such as requiring the consent of all parties—would 
ultimately fail given the very real concerns with duress that surround 
polygamous marriage.45 
To develop this argument, Part I of this Article explores the 
evolution of the practice of polygamy and the current role that it plays 
in the United States. Part II then looks at the institution of marriage, 
focusing on its evolution from an institution within the states’ complete 
authority to a fundamental right subject to significant constitutional 
protections. Shifting from marriage to divorce, Part III explores the 
protections that legal divorce affords spouses, both current and 
subsequent, as well as the incentives built into family law to encourage 
formal divorce among separating couples. Finally, Part IV argues that 
a ruling requiring the states to permit polygamy would eviscerate not 
only the incentives favoring divorce, but the corresponding protections 
the practice affords, resulting in substantial harm to both the individual 
and the state—harms that cannot be overcome by attempting to limit 
 
 41. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 42. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 43. LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN & LINDSAY F. WILEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, 
RESTRAINT 91 (2016). 
 44. Id.; see also Michael L. Rich, Brass Rings and Red-Headed Stepchildren: Protecting Active 
Criminal Informants, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1433, 1446 (2012) (“The protection of the vulnerable is 
one of the principal duties of society and a foundational goal of the legal system.”). 
 45. See infra Part IV.B; see also Jacob Richards, Note, Autonomy, Imperfect Consent, and 
Polygamist Sex Rights Claims, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 197, 201 (2010) (“[S]ubcultural and religious 
constraints make the consent of women to polygamous relationships questionable or invalid.”). 
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the availability of polygamy to those who affirmatively consent to 
entering into such a marriage. 
I. POLYGAMY: PRACTICE AND PREVALENCE WITHIN THE UNITED 
STATES 
At one time, polygamy was permitted in most parts of the world. 
Today, however, polygamy is largely relegated to countries in Africa, 
the Middle East, and Asia.46 Within the United States, the practice has 
always been—to put it mildly—disfavored. In fact, since America’s 
earliest days, the practice has been strictly illegal. “At the time of the 
founding of the nation, England and Wales prohibited polygamy, and 
each of the original thirteen states passed antipolygamy statutes. 
Criminalization was the norm.”47 
It would be a mistake, however, to trace current prohibitions and 
public attitudes about polygamy solely to those early laws.48 Instead, 
current restrictions exist largely as a reaction to the emergence in the 
1800s of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS Church): 
  Polygamy in the United States is often considered to be “human-
 
 46. MARTHA BAILEY & AMY J. KAUFMAN, POLYGAMY IN THE MONOGAMOUS WORLD: 
MULTICULTURAL CHALLENGES FOR WESTERN LAW AND POLICY 7 (2010); see also Reynolds v. 
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (“Polygamy has always been odious among the northern 
and western nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost 
exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people.”). 
 47. Shayna M. Sigman, Everything Lawyers Know About Polygamy Is Wrong, 16 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101, 108 (2006). 
 48. See id. (“The history of the criminalization of polygamy in the United States—especially 
the enforcement of any prohibitions on polygamous family structures—reveals a far more 
complex story than ‘once and always banned.’”). In a case from 1890, the Supreme Court provided 
a glimpse into the early objections to the practice of plural marriage when Justice Field 
characterized such unions as follows: “They tend to destroy the purity of the marriage relation, to 
disturb the peace of families, to degrade woman, and to debase man. Few crimes are more 
pernicious to the best interests of society, and receive more general or more deserved 
punishment.” Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341 (1890). Justice Field also stated that “[b]igamy 
and polygamy are crimes by the laws of all civilized and Christian countries,” indicating that both 
religious and racial discrimination likely motivated early prohibitions. Id. In terms of 
contemporary objections to the practice of polygamy, however, Professor Maura Irene Strassberg 
identifies two primary arguments: first, “protecting women and children from crimes such as 
‘incest, sexual assault, statutory rape, and failure to pay child support’”; and second, “the state’s 
‘interest in preventing [both] the misuse of government benefits associated with marital status’ as 
well [as] the crime of ‘failure to pay child support.’” Maura Irene Stassberg, Can We Still 
Criminalize Polygamy: Strict Scrutiny of Polygamy Laws Under State Religious Freedom 
Restoration Acts After Hobby Lobby, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1605, 1617, 1622 (2016) (first alteration 
in original) (quoting State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 744 (Utah 2006); then quoting State v. Green, 
99 P.3d 820, 830 (Utah 2004)). 
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made” in the sense that it can be readily tracked to a specific 
individual . . . . By all accounts, on July 12, 1843, Joseph Smith, Jr., 
informed the members of the church that he had a revelation that the 
faith should adopt the practice of plural marriage. . . . More than 30 
years after Smith’s revelation, the Mormon scriptures finally included 
written documentation of the event.49 
Joseph Smith, himself, would ultimately wed at least thirty-three 
women,50 and the LDS Church would come to classify polygamy as not 
only “a necessary step to reach the highest levels of heaven, but as a 
prerequisite for the second coming of Jesus Christ on Earth, and as a 
requirement for advancement within the Church.”51 
The reaction of the federal government was both swift and severe. 
Characterized—along with slavery—as one of the “twin relics of 
barbarism,”52 polygamy quickly became the subject of two 
congressional acts designed to eradicate the practice. The first was the 
1862 Morrill Act, which criminalized bigamy by providing that no 
married individual could “marry any other person, whether married or 
single, in a Territory of the United States.”53 Those who violated the 
Act could be fined, imprisoned or both.54 The law, clearly aimed at the 
LDS Church in the then-territory of Utah, ultimately did very little to 
achieve its goal of punishing polygamists and thus discouraging the 
practice. Under the territory’s existing laws, any conviction would have 
had to be handed down by a jury, which, as a practical matter, would 
have been comprised predominantly of other, sympathetic Mormons.55 
 
 49. MARILYN J. COLEMAN & LAWRENCE H. GANONG, THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN FAMILY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 1049 (2014); see CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF 
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS, http://scriptures.lds.org/dc/132/61-62 
[https://perma.cc/5YZP-FLFX] (“[I]f any man espouse a virgin, and desire to espouse another, 
and the first give her consent, and if he espouse the second, and they are virgins, and have vowed 
to no other man, then . . . he cannot commit adultery with that that belongeth unto him and to no 
one else.”). 
 50. See TODD COMPTON, IN SACRED LONELINESS: THE PLURAL WIVES OF JOSEPH SMITH 
10 (1997) (identifying thirty-three wives). But see GEORGE D. SMITH, NAUVOO POLYGAMY 54 
(2008) (putting the number at thirty-seven wives). 
 51. BAILEY & KAUFMAN, supra note 46, at 84. 
 52. Martha M. Ertman, Race Treason: The Untold Story of America’s Ban on Polygamy, 19 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 287, 307 (2010). 
 53. The Morrill Act of 1862, ch. 126, § 1, 12 Stat. 501 (1862). 
 54. Mary K. Campbell, Mr. Peay’s Horses: The Federal Response to Mormon Polygamy, 
1854–1887, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 29, 38 (2001) (“Multiple marriages subjected the offender 
to a five hundred dollar fine, five years in prison, or both.”). 
 55. Jonathan Bressler, Reconstruction and the Transformation of Jury Nullification, 78 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1133, 1192–93 (2011) (“Mormons still exercised absolute control over Utah’s legal 
HIGDON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/25/2017  11:59 AM 
92  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:79 
In 1874, then, Congress passed the Poland Act, at the heart of which 
were provisions giving federal courts jurisdiction over cases involving 
criminal bigamy, thus essentially “transferring plural marriage cases 
from the Mormon-controlled probate courts to the non-Mormon 
federal system.”56 
Believing the criminalization of polygamy unconstitutional, the 
LDS Church challenged Congress’s attempts to target polygamy. After 
George Reynolds was charged with bigamy under the Morrill Act,57 he 
challenged the conviction all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
arguing that the conviction violated his First Amendment right to 
religious liberty. The Court, in Reynolds v. United States,58 unanimously 
rejected this argument. As an initial matter, the Court noted that First 
Amendment protections encompass religious beliefs but not religious 
actions “in violation of social duties or subversive of good order.”59 
Turning then to the “action” of polygamy, the Court ruled that the 
Founders did not intend the First Amendment to cover such activity: 
  Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western 
nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon 
Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of 
African people. At common law, the second marriage was always 
void, and from the earliest history of England polygamy has been 
treated as an offence against society. . . . [Furthermore,] we think it 
may safely be said there never has been a time in any State of the 
Union when polygamy has not been an offence against society, 
cognizable by the civil courts and punishable with more or less 
severity. In the face of all this evidence, it is impossible to believe that 
the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom was intended to 
prohibit legislation in respect to this most important feature of social 
 
apparatus. The territorial legislature . . . grant[ed] extensive criminal jurisdiction to the local 
probate courts, but it also empowered local Mormon marshals, rather than federal officials, to 
summon jurors even for the federal courts.”). 
 56. Campbell, supra note 54, at 39.  
 57. George Reynolds, who was secretary to the president of the LDS Church, agreed to 
participate in this test case. See SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: 
POLYGAMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 114 (2003). 
 58. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
 59. Id. at 164. Subsequently, in Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), the Court questioned 
the Mormons’ right to even believe. There, the Court upheld a statute that required voters in the 
then-territory of Idaho to sign an oath swearing that they were not “a member of any order, 
organization, or association which teaches, advises, counsels, or encourages its members, 
devotees, or any other person, to commit the crime of bigamy or polygamy.” Id. at 347.  
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life.60 
The Court concluded that Reynolds’ argument—which would allow 
people to flout the law if their religion mandated it—would “make the 
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, 
and in effect [] permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”61 
According to Justice Vinson, writing for the Court, “Government 
could exist only in name under such circumstances.”62 
Acceptance of the Court’s ruling that religious liberty does not 
shield members of the LDS Church from criminal prosecution, coupled 
with additional congressional acts that increased the penalties and 
grounds for prosecution relating to polygamy,63 led to waning support 
among Mormons.64 Soon thereafter, even the Church itself started 
distancing itself from the practice of plural marriage. In 1890, the 
president of the LDS Church officially declared that the Church “did 
not teach polygamy or plural unions and did not permit any Church 
member to enter into such a union.”65 In light of this development—
and the fact that Utah Territory had proposed a state constitution that 
expressly prohibited polygamy—Utah was finally granted statehood in 
1896.66 
Although the LDS Church officially disavowed the practice over 
125 years ago, polygamy nonetheless continues to exist within smaller, 
often isolated communities that identify themselves as fundamentalist 
 
 60. Id. at 164–65. As this quote suggests, the United States’ reaction to polygamy was 
motivated, at least in part, by racism, xenophobia, and religious intolerance. See supra note 48. 
 61. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167. 
 62. Id.  
 63. See generally Campbell, supra note 54, at 40–51 (discussing the Edmunds Act, ch. 47, 
§§ 1, 3, 22 Stat. 30, 30–31 (1882) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1461) (repealed 1983) and the Edmunds-
Tucker Act, ch. 397, §§ 17–18, 24 Stat. 635 (1887) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 633, 660) (repealed 
1978)). 
 64. See R. Michael Otto, “Wait ‘Til Your Mothers Get Home”: Assessing the Rights of 
Polygamists as Custodial and Adoptive Parents, 1991 UTAH L. REV. 881, 894 (“By 1890, the weight 
of this authority had become too much for even the resilient Mormons to withstand. The 
imprisonment or forced exile of many of the Church’s leading authorities had all but decimated 
the Church.”). 
 65. BAILEY & KAUFMAN, supra note 46, at 93; see also JOHN WITTE, JR., THE WESTERN 
CASE OF MONOGAMY OVER POLYGAMY 436–37 (2015) (“Although polygamous ideas and 
practices lingered for a generation, giving rise to internal ecclesiastical disputes and cases, by 1906, 
the Mormon Church had made the preaching and practice of polygamy a ground for 
excommunication.”). 
 66. See Sandra Day O’Connor, The History of the Women’s Suffrage Movement, 49 VAND. 
L. REV. 657, 663 (1996). 
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Mormon.67 Statistics relating to just how many of these communities 
remain are difficult to come by; nonetheless, it has been estimated that 
there are between 37,000 and 100,000 such polygamists living in the 
United States and Canada.68 The Fundamentalist Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints (FLDS)—one of the larger organized 
communities practicing polygamy—has been estimated to have about 
8,000 members alone.69 Although plural marriages within these 
communities remain both invalid and illegal, prosecutions for bigamy 
are exceedingly rare.70 
In addition to Mormon fundamentalists, the United States also 
encounters incidences of polygamy within certain immigrant 
communities.71 Not all countries ban polygamy, so “[e]ach year, 
hundreds of thousands of immigrants enter the United States from 
countries in which polygamy is legal.”72 Given the concern that plural 
marriage might immigrate into the United States along with those who 
practice it, Congress has repeatedly attempted to bar polygamists from 
entering the United States: 
 
 67. D. Michael Quinn, Plural Marriage and Mormon Fundamentalism, in 
FUNDAMENTALISMS AND SOCIETY 240, 276 (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby eds., 1993) 
(“There are ten times more polygamists now in the United States than in 1862, the year of the 
first federal law against polygamy.”). 
 68. BAILEY & KAUFMAN, supra note 46, at 95. 
 69. Id. (“Members of the FLDS believe they are the true Latter-day Saints, as they are living 
Joseph Smith’s revelation that men must have at least three wives to enter the highest realm of 
heaven.”). 
 70. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, many in these communities have 
been subject to police investigation and criminal prosecution for other crimes, typically those 
relating to sexual abuse of minors. See generally Martin Guggenheim, Texas Polygamy and Child 
Welfare, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 759 (2009) (discussing the two major efforts police undertook to break 
up polygamous communities); Jonathan Turley, The Loadstone Rock: The Role of Harm in the 
Criminalization of Plural Unions, 64 EMORY L.J. 1905 (2015) (discussing a Canadian case alleging 
sexual abuse against polygamists); Jessica Dixon Weaver, The Texas Mis-Step: Why the Largest 
Child Removal in Modern U.S. History Failed, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 449 (2010) 
(discussing the breakup of the Yearning for Zion Ranch community of polygamists where a minor 
alleged that her spiritual husband sexually abused her); Amy Fry, Comment, Polygamy in 
America: How the Varying Legal Standards Fail To Protect Mothers and Children from Its Abuses, 
54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 967 (2010) (recounting situations where minors were the subjects of crimes 
in polygamous communities). 
 71. See Jamie M. Gher, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage—Allies or Adversaries Within the 
Same-Sex Marriage Movement, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 559, 577 (2008) (“In addition to 
fundamentalist Mormons, it is suspected that there are a significant number of immigrant families 
engaging in polygamy in the United States.”). 
 72. Smearman, supra note 39, at 385 (“According to the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), in 2007 alone, close to half a million immigrants obtained lawful permanent resident status 
from countries in which polygamy is practiced in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.”). 
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[P]olygamy has been a bar to admission to the United States since the 
Immigration Act of 1891. Polygamy as a ground of inadmissibility 
casts a long shadow throughout the Immigration and Nationality Act 
of 1952 (INA), the foundation of present immigration law. Currently 
codified at INA § 212(a)(10)(A), the polygamy ground of 
inadmissibility (the polygamy bar) is incorporated into numerous 
provisions of the INA, ranging from adjustment of status (the process 
for obtaining a green card) to deportation and naturalization. The 
INA does not recognize a polygamous marriage as a valid marriage 
for immigration purposes, includes polygamy as a statutory bar to a 
finding of good moral character, and lists bigamy, the criminal law 
under which polygamy is typically prosecuted, [as] a crime of moral 
turpitude.73 
But such attempts can hardly be expected to weed out every polygamist 
who attempts to enter the country. In addition, these prohibitions only 
apply to practicing polygamists and not to individuals who, though not 
currently practicing, emigrate from cultures where plural marriage is 
encouraged and perhaps expected. It should therefore come as little 
surprise to discover that polygamy exists in a variety of immigrant 
communities in the United States, ranging “from groups of African 
immigrants in New York City to Hmong immigrants from Vietnam 
living in Minneapolis.”74 
In sum, plural marriage has a long history of being subject to 
criminal prohibition and widespread social condemnation in the 
United States. Nonetheless, the practice survives in communities 
throughout the country to this day. Many believe the number of people 
living in polygamous households may continue to grow.75 As a result, 
the Court’s recent decision legalizing same-sex marriage—which, like 
polygamy, was also once subject to legal and social disdain—has led 
 
 73. Id. at 383–84. 
 74. Id. at 387; see also BAILEY & KAUFMAN, supra note 46, at 96 (referencing a radio show 
on NPR that “profiled a family in Philadelphia where the husband, already married to one 
woman, had gone through a Muslim religious marriage ceremony with another woman”). 
 75. See JANET BENNION, POLYGAMY IN PRIMETIME: MEDIA, GENDER, AND POLITICS IN 
MORMON FUNDAMENTALISM 263 (2012) (discussing the “growing number of Muslims who 
believe they are allowed four wives according to the Quran”); Cyra Akila Choudhury, Between 
Tradition and Progress: A Comparative Perspective on Polygamy in the United States and India, 
83 U. COLO. L. REV. 963, 967 (2012) (“[T]he practice flourishes in some communities even if 
driven into the closet by the law, and its incidence in the United States might be increasing.”); 
Pauline Bartolone, Opinion, For These Muslims, Polygamy Is an Option, SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRONICLE (Aug. 5, 2007, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/For-these-Muslims-
polygamy-is-an-option-2549200.php [https://perma.cc/96ER-YTL2] (describing increased 
practice of polygamy among African-American Muslims). 
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people to question whether plural marriage could soon follow suit. In 
considering that ultimate question, however, it would be short sighted 
to focus exclusively on the impact legalization would have on the 
polygamous communities discussed here; instead, one must also take 
into account the effect legalization might have on sequential bigamists. 
And, as discussed below in Parts III and IV, that impact would be 
significant. 
II. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO MARRY: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
Although the law of domestic relations is generally seen as the 
exclusive province of the states, the Supreme Court has, over time, 
increasingly limited the states’ ability to regulate marriage. This 
evolution has taken place relatively recently: in 1888, the Supreme 
Court in Maynard v. Hill76 recognized, albeit in dicta, that “[m]arriage 
. . . has always been subject to the control of the legislature.”77 If that 
standard were still the case today, polygamy would likely have no 
chance of resurrection. After all, no state permits plural marriage.78 
Every state has explicitly made the practice illegal. For political 
reasons, it is unlikely that a state would legislatively reverse course. 
Since Maynard was written, however, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, there are notable limits to a state’s ability to regulate 
marriage.79 Specifically, the Court has declared that, under the 
substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the right to marry is a fundamental right.80 Accordingly, 
any law depriving a citizen of that right is subject to strict scrutiny, 
requiring that law to be a necessary response to a compelling 
government objective81—a level of scrutiny routinely described as 
“strict in theory, fatal in fact.”82 In light of these constitutional 
 
 76. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1887).  
 77. Id. at 205 (emphasis added). 
 78. See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text; see also Anne Laquer Estin, Underground 
Family Law, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT: MULTI-TIERED 
MARRIAGE AND THE BOUNDARIES OF CIVIL LAW AND RELIGION 92, 115 (Joel A. Nichols ed., 
2011) (“Official laws in the United States prohibit and sanction polygamy at every level, from 
national immigration statutes to local criminal law.”). 
 79. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013) (recognizing that the states’ 
interest in regulating marriage is limited by constitutional guarantees). 
 80. See infra notes 85–98 and accompanying text. 
 81. Lynn A. Stout, Strict Scrutiny and Social Choice: An Economic Inquiry into Fundamental 
Rights and Suspect Classifications, 80 GEO. L.J. 1787, 1787 (1992). 
 82. Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 918 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting how “subject to strict scrutiny” 
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limitations, it might be that—and indeed some have argued that83—
states cannot prohibit polygamous marriages.84 
Although the Court noted the importance of the right to marry as 
early as 1942,85 it was not until the Court’s 1967 decision in Loving v. 
Virginia86 that the Court would explicitly characterize the right as 
fundamental.87 In Loving, the Court was confronted with Virginia’s 
antimiscegenation statute, which made it “unlawful for any white 
person in [Virginia] to marry [anyone except another] white person.”88 
Richard Loving and Mildred Jeter, an interracial couple, had violated 
the statute when they married in D.C. and subsequently moved to 
Virginia.89 After being arrested, the two pled guilty and received a one-
year jail sentence.90 The judge suspended their sentence but only on the 
condition that they leave the state for twenty-five years.91 In ruling as 
he did, the judge infamously reasoned, “Almighty God created the 
races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on 
separate continents . . . . The fact that he separated the races shows that 
he did not intend for the races to mix.”92 
On appeal, the Court first noted that “[w]hile the state court is no 
 
has often been thought of as a “euphemism for ‘absolutely forbidden’”). 
 83. See, e.g., Ronald C. Den Otter, Three May Not Be a Crowd: The Case for a Constitutional 
Right to Plural Marriage, 64 EMORY L.J. 1977, 2044 (2015) (taking the position that “as the state 
remains in the marriage business, it must legally recognize any intimate relationship that 
competent, consenting adults want to form, regardless of its number, gender composition, or 
interpersonal dynamics, provided that the behaviors do not violate other valid laws”); Jack B. 
Harrison, On Marriage and Polygamy, 42 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 89, 146 (2015) (“Has the Supreme 
Court, both in its cases recognizing the fundamental right to marry and in its developing gay rights 
jurisprudence . . . created a pathway for a future recognition of polygamous marriage? This 
Article argues that is indeed what the Court has done.”). 
 84. See Casey E. Faucon, Polygamy After Windsor: What’s Religion Got to Do with It?, 9 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 471, 528 (2015) (“[H]igher courts and legislatures may very well have to 
square the issue of polygamy with modern conceptions of marriage and liberty sooner than 
anticipated.”). 
 85. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (stating that 
“[m]arriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race”). 
 86. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 87. ROGER J. R. LEVESQUE, CHILD MALTREATMENT AND THE LAW: RETURNING TO FIRST 
PRINCIPLES 46 (2009) (noting that, prior to Loving, “the Court had yet to rule that marriage itself 
was a fundamental right deserving robust constitutional protection”).  
 88. Loving, 388 U.S. at 5 n.4. 
 89. Id. at 2. 
 90. Id. at 3. 
 91. Id. For a more comprehensive discussion of the Lovings and their journey to the Supreme 
Court, see generally Robert A. Pratt, The Case of Mr. and Mrs. Loving: Reflections on the Fortieth 
Anniversary of Loving v. Virginia, in FAMILY LAW STORIES 7 (Carol Sanger ed., 2008). 
 92. Loving, 388 U.S. at 3 (quoting the Virginia trial judge). 
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doubt correct in asserting that marriage is a social relation subject to 
the State’s police power, the State [correctly] does not contend . . . that 
its powers to regulate marriage are unlimited notwithstanding the 
commands of the Fourteenth Amendment.”93 In other words, what the 
Court had previously stated in Maynard about the states’ broad 
authority to regulate marriage was actually subject to constitutional 
regulations. The Court then turned to two such constitutional 
limitations to strike down the Virginia law. First, the Court held that 
the statute violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.94 As the Court noted, the statute “prohibits only 
interracial marriages involving white persons,” and was thus designed 
to promote white supremacy.95 
Although the Court’s opinion could have stopped there, the Court 
went on to hold that the statute also ran afoul of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court noted that “[t]he 
freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal 
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”96 In 
light of that recognition, the Court spent little time finding that the 
Virginia law violated substantive due process: 
To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the 
racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so 
directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State’s citizens of 
liberty without due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment 
requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by 
invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom 
to marry or not marry, a person of another race resides with the 
individual and cannot be infringed by the State.97 
With that, the Court ruled that the Virginia law was unconstitutional. 
In the process, the Court issued what is today regarded as one of its 
most landmark decisions relating to the law of the family.98 
 
 93. Id. at 7 (emphasis added) (citing Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888)). 
 94. Id. at 11. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted the state’s proffered justifications 
“‘to preserve the racial integrity of its citizens,’ and to prevent ‘the corruption of blood,’ ‘a 
mongrel breed of citizens,’ and ‘the obliteration of racial pride . . . .’” Id. at 7 (quoting Naim v. 
Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955)). 
 95. Id. at 11.  
 96. Id. at 12. 
 97. Id.  
 98. See Robert A. Destro, Law and the Politics of Marriage: Loving v. Virginia After 30 
Years: Introduction, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1207, 1209 (1998) (“Loving v. Virginia is, by any 
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Since Loving, the Court has decided three other key cases in which 
it has reaffirmed its understanding of marriage as a fundamental right.99 
A little over ten years after Loving, the Court in Zablocki v. Redhail100 
was confronted with a Wisconsin statute that prohibited a noncustodial 
parent who had to pay child support from obtaining a marriage license 
without court approval.101 The statute further prohibited a court from 
granting such permission unless the support obligation had been met 
and the children in question “[were] not then and [were] not likely 
thereafter to become public charges.”102 Roger Redhail brought a 
constitutional challenge to the law after his request for a marriage 
license was denied.103 The Court ruled that the Wisconsin law 
unconstitutionally violated his fundamental right to marry.104 The 
Court noted that, under the statute in question, individuals like 
Redhail, who were incapable of paying their child support obligation, 
would be “absolutely prevented from getting married.”105 For others, 
who were “able in theory to satisfy the statute’s requirements,” they 
could nonetheless “be sufficiently burdened by having to do so that 
they will in effect be coerced into forgoing their right to marry.”106 
Given the degree to which the Wisconsin statute interfered with 
the fundamental right to marry, the Court applied strict scrutiny, 
meaning that the law in question could only be upheld if “supported by 
sufficiently important state interests” and “closely tailored to 
effectuate only those interests.”107 Despite the state’s attempts to 
justify the law, the Court ruled that, even if those interests were 
“legitimate and substantial,” the statute could not be upheld because it 
was simply too broad.108 Thus, “the means selected by the State for 
 
definition, a landmark case.”); Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
825, 854–55 (2004) (“Legal authorities and legal scholars consistently identify Loving as one of 
the most crucial decisions in family law, illuminating family law’s nature and core values.”). 
 99. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); 
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
 100. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
 101. Id. at 375. 
 102. Id. (quoting WIS. STAT. § 245.10 (repealed 1977)). 
 103. Id. at 376. 
 104. Id. at 383. 
 105. Id. at 387. Redhail fathered a child while he was in high school and, at the time Redhail 
sought to obtain a marriage license, he had not only failed to satisfy his support obligations to the 
child, but “the child had been a public charge since her birth, receiving benefits under the Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children program.” Id. at 377–78. 
 106. Id. at 377. 
 107. Id. at 388. 
 108. Id. 
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achieving these interests unnecessarily impinge on the right to 
marry.”109 In an attempt to clarify what forms of state regulation 
pertaining to marriage were permissible, the Court was clear that it did 
not “mean to suggest that every state regulation which relates in any 
way to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected 
to rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary, reasonable regulations that do 
not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital 
relationship may legitimately be imposed.”110 
Almost ten years later, in Turner v. Safley,111 the Court would once 
again be called upon to apply the fundamental right to marriage. In 
that case, the law at issue arose from regulations promulgated by the 
Missouri Division of Corrections.112 The regulation in question, 
motivated by security concerns,113 permitted “an inmate to marry only 
with the permission of the superintendent of the prison, and provide[d] 
that such approval should be given only ‘when there are compelling 
reasons to do so.’”114 The Court ruled that the regulation in question 
was far too overinclusive and, thus, unconstitutional.115 Specifically, the 
Court stated that “[t]here are obvious, easy alternatives to the Missouri 
regulation that accommodate the right to marry while imposing a de 
minimis burden on the pursuit of security objectives.”116 In sum, the 
Court concluded that, although “Missouri prison officials may regulate 
the time and circumstances under which the marriage ceremony itself 
takes place . . . . [But] the almost complete ban on the decision to marry 
 
 109. Id. The interests put forward by the state were twofold. First, “the permission-to-marry 
proceeding furnishes an opportunity to counsel the applicant as to the necessity of fulfilling his 
prior support obligations . . . .” Id. Second, the state expressed interests in encouraging 
noncustodial parents to meet and maintain their support obligations, and in protecting “the ability 
of marriage applicants to meet support obligations to prior children by preventing the applicants 
from incurring new support obligations” that might arise from a subsequent marriage. Id. at 390. 
 110. Id. at 386. 
 111. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).  
 112. Id. at 81. 
 113. Id. at 97. The justifications advanced by Missouri included security concerns relating to 
the fear “that ‘love triangles’ might lead to violent confrontations between inmates” and 
rehabilitation concerns relating to the need for female inmates to focus on developing self-
reliance. Id. To the latter point, the state argued that the “female prisoners often were subject to 
abuse at home or were overly dependent on male figures, and that this dependence or abuse was 
connected to the crimes they had committed.” Id. 
 114. Id. at 82. The Court explained that “[t]he term ‘compelling’ is not defined, but prison 
officials testified at trial that generally only a pregnancy or the birth of an illegitimate child would 
be considered a compelling reason.” Id. 
 115. Id. at 97–98. 
 116. Id. at 98 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 551.10 (1986) (allowing inmates in federal prison to marry 
unless warden finds that the marriage would threaten security, order, or public safety)).  
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is not reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives.”117 
Whereas Loving, Turner, and Zablocki all involved marriage 
restrictions deemed unconstitutional, lower courts have upheld a 
variety of other state restrictions on marriage. These restrictions 
include age requirements,118 prohibitions against incestuous 
marriage,119 and statutes requiring blood tests as a condition of 
marriage.120 In such instances, the laws at issue were seen merely as 
“reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with 
decisions to enter into the marital relationship.”121 As LGBT advocates 
began advocating for same-sex marriage, however, states began to 
supplement these restrictions by adding gender requirements to their 
marriage laws.122 The question became whether such restrictions were 
within the province of the state or if, like the restrictions at issue in 
Turner, Zablocki, and Loving, these statutes were instead 
unconstitutional. 
In 2015, that question was answered by the Court’s historic ruling 
in Obergefell v. Hodges.123 In that case, the Court was called upon to 
decide whether a state could constitutionally deny same-sex couples 
the right to marry. The Court began by reaffirming its prior holdings 
that “the right to marry is protected by the Constitution.”124 The Court, 
however, could not rely exclusively on those prior holdings, given that 
each had clearly “presumed a relationship involving opposite-sex 
 
 117. Id. at 99. 
 118. See, e.g., Moe v. Dinkins, 533 F. Supp. 623, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that parental 
consent requirement for marriages by minors “does not offend the constitutional rights of minors 
but represents a constitutionally valid exercise of state power”).  
 119. See, e.g., Singh v. Singh, 569 A.2d 1112, 1121 (Conn. 1990) (upholding state statute that 
voids incestuous marriage); State v. Sharon H., 429 A.2d 1321, 1330 (Del. 1981) (allowing an incest 
prosecution to proceed against a half brother and half sister who wed).  
 120. See, e.g., Peterson v. Widule, 147 N.W. 966, 971 (Wis. 1914) (upholding state law 
requiring a blood test as a condition precedent to receiving a marriage license). 
 121. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978). In fact, Justice Stewart, in his concurrence 
in Zablocki, opined that: 
[s]urely, for example, a State may legitimately say that no one can marry his or her 
sibling, that no one can marry who is not at least 14 years old, that no one can marry 
without first passing an examination for venereal disease, or that no one can marry who 
has a living husband or wife.  
Id. at 392 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 122. See Meredith Johnson Harbach, Is the Family a Federal Question?, 66 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 131, 192 (2009) (noting that, in 2009, “[f]orty-five states prohibit[ed] same-sex marriage by 
statute, constitutional amendment, or both”). 
 123. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 124. Id. at 2598. 
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partners.”125 Nonetheless, Justice Kennedy’s opinion stated that a 
closer analysis of these previous cases “compels the conclusion that 
same-sex couples may exercise the right to marry.”126 Specifically, the 
Court identified four essential “principles and traditions” related to 
marriage that justify its classification as a fundamental right—
principles and traditions that, according to the Court, apply with equal 
force to same-sex couples.127 
First, the Court declared that “the right to personal choice 
regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual 
autonomy.”128 Citing Loving, the Court recognized that “[t]here is 
dignity in the bond between two men or two women who seek to marry 
and in their autonomy to make such profound choices.”129 Second, the 
Court cited the understanding that marriage “supports a two-person 
union unlike any other in its importance to the committed 
individuals.”130 The Court explained that “[m]arriage responds to the 
universal fear that a lonely person might call out only to find no one 
there. It offers the hope of companionship and understanding and 
assurance that while both still live there will be someone to care for the 
other.”131 Third, the Court looked to other individual rights to reveal 
that marriage “safeguards children and families and thus draws 
meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and 
education.”132 Quoting Zablocki, where the Court held that “[t]he right 
to marry, establish a home and bring up children is a central part of the 
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause,”133 the Court went on to 
explain that “[b]y giving recognition and legal structure to their 
parents’ relationship, marriage allows children ‘to understand the 
integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other 
 
 125. Id. The Court had, in fact, previously issued a decision relating to same-sex couples and 
their right to marry. In Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (mem.), the Court dismissed an 
appeal from a decision disallowing same-sex marriage for want of a federal question. Id. 
Obergefell overruled Baker. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605. 
 126. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. The Court also explained that “[t]he nature of marriage is that, through its enduring 
bond, two persons together can find other freedoms, such as expression, intimacy, and 
spirituality.” Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 2600. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978)). 
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families in their community and in their daily lives.’”134 Finally, the 
Court, relying on both precedent and tradition, held that “marriage is 
a keystone of our social order.”135 In other words, marriage is “the 
foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be 
neither civilization nor progress.”136 In recognition of that importance, 
“just as a couple vows to support each other, so does society pledge to 
support the couple, offering symbolic recognition and material benefits 
to protect and nourish the union.”137 
Having broken marriage down into those elements justifying its 
recognition as a fundamental right, the Court then turned its attention 
to same-sex unions, where it found no basis for holding that such 
relationships fall outside this right: 
Same-sex couples, too, may aspire to the transcendent purposes of 
marriage and seek fulfillment in its highest meaning. 
  The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have 
seemed natural and just, but its inconsistency with the central 
meaning of the fundamental right to marry is now manifest. With that 
knowledge must come the recognition that laws excluding same-sex 
couples from the marriage right impose stigma and injury of the kind 
prohibited by our basic charter.138 
Accordingly, the Court held that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from denying same-sex 
couples the ability to marry on terms equal to those available to 
opposite-sex couples.139 
In ruling as it did, the Court made sure to note that “these cases 
involve only the rights of two consenting adults whose marriages would 
pose no risk of harm to themselves or third parties.”140 Thus, there is 
nothing in Obergefell that would explicitly require a state to recognize 
a plural marriage. Indeed, no court has applied Obergefell to reach such 
a conclusion. Some have nonetheless argued that the four principles of 
marriage outlined by Justice Kennedy could apply with equal force to 
 
 134. Id. (quoting United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013)). The Court 
continued: “Marriage also affords the permanency and stability important to children’s best 
interests.” Id. 
 135. Id. at 2601. 
 136. Id. (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888)). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 2602. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 2607 (emphasis added). 
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polygamous marriages.141 After all, if the fact that marriage had 
historically been defined as male-female was no impediment to same-
sex marriage, why should the fact that it has been traditionally limited 
to two people prevent plural marriage from likewise falling within the 
fundamental right? Justice Roberts, in his dissent, suggested that such 
a ruling would actually be less remarkable than the one reached by the 
majority. “[F]rom the standpoint of history and tradition, a leap from 
opposite-sex marriage to same-sex marriage is much greater than one 
from a two-person union to plural unions, which have deep roots in 
some cultures around the world.”142 
III. THE PROTECTIVE FUNCTION OF DIVORCE 
Legal divorce offers a variety of protections—protections that 
extend not only to the divorcing parties themselves, but also to those 
parties’ subsequent spouses. As noted earlier and discussed more fully 
below, it is these protections that incentivize separating couples, who 
might find themselves in a prisoner’s dilemma leading them to informal 
separation, to instead opt for formal divorce. Indeed, the states have a 
strong interest in promoting divorce—by protecting the parties to the 
marriage, divorce likewise advances the states’ substantial interest in 
“the protection of an economically vulnerable spouse from great 
financial hardship at the end of marriage.”143 Because divorce cannot 
exist without marriage, however, one must first understand the states’ 
interest in marriage before one can fully understand the legal and 
societal value of divorce. 
In short, marriage helps provide stability to adult relationships and 
also helps protect the welfare of the children resulting from those 
relationships.144 Marriage is thus an institution that American law 
strives to actively promote and encourage beyond its status as a 
 
 141. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 142. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2621 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 143. Gail Frommer Brod, Premarital Agreements and Gender Justice, 6 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 229, 233 (1994); see also Daniel B. Griffith, The Best Interests Standard: A Comparison 
of the State’s Parens Patriae Authority and Judicial Oversight in Best Interests Determinations for 
Children and Incompetent Patients, 7 ISSUES L. & MED. 283, 331 (1991) (“[T]he state’s parens 
patriae power serves to protect all individuals of the state who cannot protect themselves.”). 
 144. See Maxine Eichner, Marriage and the Elephant: The Liberal Democratic State’s 
Regulation of Intimate Relationships Between Adults, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 25, 43 (2007) 
(noting the “important role the state can play in creating a stable environment that fosters the 
well-being of children by formalizing and privileging relationships such as marriage”).  
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fundamental right.145 To make marriage a more attractive option, the 
law extends a number of advantages to married couples—what Justice 
Kennedy in Obergefell referred to as a “constellation of benefits”146: 
These aspects of marital status include: taxation; inheritance and 
property rights; rules of intestate succession; spousal privilege in the 
law of evidence; hospital access; medical decisionmaking authority; 
adoption rights; the rights and benefits of survivors; birth and death 
certificates; professional ethics rules; campaign finance restrictions; 
workers’ compensation benefits; health insurance; and child custody, 
support, and visitation rules. Valid marriage under state law is also a 
significant status for over a thousand provisions of federal law.147 
According to Justice Kennedy, this panoply of rights partly contributes 
to the very classification of marriage as a fundamental right: “The 
States have contributed to the fundamental character of the marriage 
right by placing that institution at the center of so many facets of the 
legal and social order.”148 
The flip side of marriage is, of course, divorce. Just as states aim 
to encourage marriage, it is the policy of every state to discourage 
divorce.149 It may seem somewhat ironic, then, that the states have—in 
the not too distant past—made divorce much easier to obtain.150 The 
most notable example of that shift would be the adoption of no-fault 
 
 145. See Huiet v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 28 S.E.2d 83, 84 (Ga. Ct. App. 1943) (“Marriage is 
encouraged by the law, and every effort to restrain or discourage marriage by contract, condition, 
limitation, or otherwise, shall be invalid and void.” (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 53-107 (1933))). 
 146. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601; see also Adam Chase, Tax Planning for Same-Sex Couples, 
72 DENV. U. L. REV. 359, 359 (1995) (noting the “panoply of entitlements and privileges that 
come as part of the institution of marriage”). 
 147. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601 (citations omitted); see also Kara S. Suffredini & Madeleine 
V. Findley, Speak Now: Progressive Considerations on the Advent of Civil Marriage for Same-Sex 
Couples, 45 B.C. L. REV. 595, 598 n.10 (2004) (detailing some of the “1138 federal benefits, rights, 
and obligations” that flow from marriage).  
 148. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601.  
 149. See Tiffany N. Lee, Divorce and Dissolution, 2 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 347, 360 (2001) 
(noting that many states, in response to the shift to no-fault divorce, have “taken measures to 
discourage divorce”); Peter Nash Swisher, Reassessing Fault Factors in No-Fault Divorce, 31 FAM. 
L.Q. 269, 290–91 (1997) (“Since marriage and the modern American family still serve a valuable 
social, legal, economic, and institutional function, the underlying public policy of most states 
continues to promote marriage and discourage divorce unless the parties comply with the 
required statutory guidelines for divorce.”); Note, Interlocutory Decrees of Divorce, 56 COLUM. 
L. REV. 228, 228 (1956) (“It is the policy of all states to encourage the continuance of the marital 
state and to discourage divorces.”). 
 150. See JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, & INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN 291 
(1994) (noting that, since 1969, all state reforms related to marriage dissolution “have generally 
made divorce easier to obtain”). 
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divorce.151 Previously, married couples could not obtain a divorce 
unless one of the parties could prove one of several fault-based 
grounds, including adultery, desertion, and cruelty.152 But the shift 
away from requiring fault was necessary—somewhat ironically—to 
promote marriage.153 With the sexual revolution, the stigma that 
accompanied cohabitation without marriage was greatly eroded, so 
much so that couples faced an increasing temptation to elect this more 
informal living situation.154 After all, the more difficult it is to extricate 
oneself from marriage, the greater the temptation to simply 
cohabitate.155 Judge Richard A. Posner explains that “[t]he more costly 
a mistake is, the less likely it is to be committed; and a mistake in 
choosing a spouse is more costly in a system that forbids divorce (or 
makes it very difficult) than in one that permits it.”156 In other words, 
when obtaining divorce becomes too difficult, another example of a 
prisoner’s dilemma arises, one that would encourage couples not to 
marry and instead elect a more informal living arrangement. To avoid 
that likelihood, the states made divorce easier to obtain, thus providing 
more incentive for couples to avoid such temptations and opt for a 
formal marriage.157 
 
 151. Rebecca E. Silberbogen, Does the Dissolution of Covenant Marriages Mirror Common 
Law England’s Subordination of Women?, 5 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 207, 224 (1998) 
(“Since the introduction of no-fault divorce, divorces are easier to obtain . . . .”). 
 152. See generally Adriaen M. Morse Jr., Fault: A Viable Means of Re-Injecting Responsibility 
in Marital Relations, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 605 (1996) (arguing for “re-injecting some elements of 
fault into the process of marital dissolution”). 
 153. RODERICK PHILLIPS, PUTTING ASUNDER: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN WESTERN 
SOCIETY 571–72 (1988) (describing no-fault divorce as resulting from “wide-sweeping 
liberalization of attitudes toward many institutions and forms of behavior that was characteristic 
of the 1960s and 1970s”). 
 154. See Maggie Gallagher & Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, End No-Fault Divorce?, FIRST 
THINGS (Aug. 1997), https://www.firstthings.com/article/1997/08/end-no-fault-divorce#print 
[https://perma.cc/8UHH-YQBL] (“The states adopted no-fault divorce laws in the 1970s in an 
effort to bring legal norms into closer conformity with the more permissive extralegal norms.”). 
As Whitehead explains, “[t]he divorce revolution was a cultural rather than legal phenomenon. 
It grew out of a historic transformation in ideas and practices regarding sex, marriage, and 
parenthood.” Id. 
 155. See Antony W. Dnes, Cohabitation and Marriage, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF 
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 118, 129 (Antony W. Dnes & Robert Rowthorn eds., 2002) (“[T]he 
growth in cohabitation may be nothing more than a rational response to rather messy marital 
laws.”). 
 156. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 5.2, at 165 (9th ed. 2014). 
 157. See Gallagher & Whitehead, supra note 154, at 28 (“For a generation so worried and 
confused, the impact of fault law is more likely to discourage marriage than encourage it.”); see 
also Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking about Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 
13 (1990) (noting how fault-based divorced imposed “costs on divorce”).  
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Lowering the restrictions on divorce offers one additional 
benefit—it helps ensure that those desiring to end their relationship 
actually go through the formal process of obtaining a divorce, rather 
than simply dividing up the property themselves and going their 
separate ways. In this limited sense (that is, when the options are either 
desertion or divorce), the law does wish to encourage divorce.158 After 
all, doing so protects not only the parties themselves, but the parties’ 
subsequent spouses, all of which helps safeguard the state’s interest in 
protecting its citizens from economic and social harm. 
A. Protections for Former Spouses 
Marriage is often analogized to a business partnership and, 
correspondingly, divorce to a partnership dissolution proceeding.159 
Such an analogy, however, is far from perfect given that there are 
crucial differences between business structures and marital unions. As 
Posner points out, the dissolution of a marriage is unlike that of a 
business partnership because “the division of the marital income may 
not be determined by the relative value of each spouse’s 
contribution.”160 In a marriage, “each may derive utility from the 
consumption expenditures of the other.”161 Accordingly, divorce 
proceedings contain a number of difficulties not present in proceedings 
to divide a partnership: 
  When a conventional partnership is dissolved, the assets of the 
partnership must be distributed among the partners, and it is the same 
with marriage. But determining the spouses’ respective shares of the 
assets acquired by the household during the marriage is difficult. If 
the wife has had very little market income, all or most of the 
household’s tangible assets will have been bought with the husband’s 
money. Yet his earning capacity may owe much to her efforts. She 
may have supported him while he was a student in law school or 
 
 158. See Hill v. Hill, 142 P.2d 417, 422 (Cal. 1943) (“[P]ublic policy does not discourage 
divorce where the relations between husband and wife are such that the legitimate objects of 
matrimony have been utterly destroyed.”). 
 159. See Theodore F. Haas, The Rationality and Enforceability of Contractual Restrictions on 
Divorce, 66 N.C. L. REV. 879, 902 (1988) (“Thus, a business partnership is analogous to modern 
marriage in which each spouse has the right to dissolve at will.”); Jane Rutheford, Duty in Divorce: 
Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 539, 554 (1990) (“[C]ourts and 
legislatures analogize marriage to partnership.”). 
 160. POSNER, supra note 156, § 5.1, at 161; see also Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 
77 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 35 (1989) (“The complete elimination of alimony probably alone renders the 
partnership model unacceptable.”). 
 161. POSNER, supra note 156, § 5.1, at 161. 
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medical school, reducing her own consumption and also forgoing 
opportunities to increase her own earning capacity through advanced 
training.162 
Despite these inherent difficulties, the courts strive to insure that the 
marital property is divided both equitably and in a way that 
“‘compensate[s]’ both parties to a marriage for their respective 
contributions.”163 
In fact, the very structure of divorce proceedings aims to ensure 
that the rights and benefits of each former spouse are adequately 
protected. Two facets of divorce law in particular warrant discussion 
here: first, the law’s refusal to sanction informal or common law 
divorce, and second, the court’s insistence on independently reviewing 
settlement agreements to ensure that both parties are being treated 
equitably. 
1. The Absence of Common Law Divorce.  Although a handful of 
states permit couples to wed informally, without any requirement that 
they obtain a marriage license or hold a marriage ceremony,164 no state 
permits such informality when it comes to divorce. Instead, in an 
attempt to safeguard the economic interests of the divorcing parties, 
states require strict adherence to both the substantive and procedural 
dictates of that state’s divorce laws.165 So while marriage can sometimes 
be created by informal means, no marriage can be dissolved without 
the judicial system playing at least some role in the process. 
Common law marriage is a means of obtaining the legal 
protections of marriage without going through the strictures of the 
formal marriage process. Common law marriage merely requires that 
the couple intend to be married, have the legal capacity to wed, 
exchange words with one another to that effect, and, in many states, 
both cohabitate and hold themselves out to the community as a 
married couple.166 Although this practice was historically justified by 
 
 162. Id. § 5.3, at 168. 
 163. Ann Laquer Estin, Maintenance, Alimony, and the Rehabilitation of Family Care, 71 N.C. 
L. REV. 721, 748 (1993).  
 164. See generally GORAN LIND, COMMON LAW MARRIAGE: A LEGAL INSTITUTION FOR 
COHABITATION (2008) (describing common law unions that lack the formalities of traditional 
marriage). 
 165. See, e.g., Kergosien v. Kergosien, 471 So. 2d 1206, 1210 (Miss. 1985) (“Divorce is a 
creature of statute . . . . It is a statutory act and the statutes must be strictly followed as they are 
in derogation of the common law.”).  
 166. See CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY OF DIVORCE: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 300 (Robert E. Emery 
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the fact that people living in rural, isolated areas of the United States 
might not have access to the “civil and religious authorities” required 
for a ceremonial marriage,167 it is now justified by a need to protect the 
parties to the marriage. Common law marriage protects the parties’ 
expectations that their conduct effectuated a valid marriage, thus 
securing the benefits and protections that flow from marriage.168 It also 
protects “those members of society who can least afford to give up any 
part of the limited protections the law currently affords them.”169 
Specifically, it protects “the poor, women, children, and members of 
minority groups”170 who might otherwise be at the mercy of a 
cohabitating partner who, for a variety of reasons, refuses to engage in 
a formal marriage ceremony.171 
In contrast to common law marriage, no state permits couples to 
dissolve a marriage by informal means.172 Nor does any state appear to 
be moving in that direction,173 which is a somewhat telling omission 
given the increasing amount of control states have given married 
couples over the terms of their marriage. As Professor Theodore F. 
Haas explains, “[p]rivate ordering of marital and postmarital 
relationships generally has been accepted with respect to certain 
incidents of those relationships—ownership of property and, to a lesser 
 
ed., 2013); LIND, supra note 164, at 187 (“A cornerstone in the Western concept of marriage is 
the requirement that the parties possess the legal capacity to marry.”). 
 167. PNC Bank Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 831 A.2d 1269, 1279 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2003). As one court noted, “[t]he covered wagon days are over. In this county no person lives, 
who cannot in some manner easily reach the county courthouse and partake of the beneficence 
of those who are by law endowed with the privilege authorizing and conducting the marriage 
ceremony.” In re Estate of Soeder, 220 N.E.2d 547, 562 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966). 
 168. See Kathryn S. Vaughn, The Recent Changes to the Texas Informal Marriage Statute: 
Limitation or Abolition of Common-Law Marriage?, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 1131, 1140–41 (1991) 
(arguing that common law marriage protects the parties’ expectation of marriage). 
 169. Id. at 1141. 
 170. Id.; see also Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal To Bring Back Common Law 
Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709, 779 (1996) (advocating for common law marriage on the basis that 
“it protects the interests of women, especially poor women and women of color”).  
 171. See Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100 COLUM. 
L. REV. 957, 964 (2000) (noting that one of the policies underlying common law marriage is “that 
the law should protect innocent women from the whims and contrivances of irresponsible or 
rakish men”).  
 172. See Haas, supra note 159, at 881 n.13 (“[S]uch a method of divorcing is unknown to 
Anglo-American law.”); Raven C. Lidman & Betsy R. Hollingsworth, The Guardian Ad Litem 
in Child Custody Cases: The Contours of Our Judicial System Stretched Beyond Recognition, 6 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 255, 287 n.156 (1998) (“There is no such thing as ‘common law divorce.’”). 
 173. See Haas, supra note 159, at 881 n.13 (“There is no readily discernible trend either toward 
the reinstitution of common law marriage or toward the institution of common law divorce.”). 
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extent, support. However, divorce itself—the change of marital 
status—has remained a matter of public rather than private 
ordering.”174 Even common law marriages can only be dissolved by a 
formal divorce. “If there is a valid common law marriage, it cannot 
thereafter be dissolved except in the same manner as a valid 
ceremonial marriage—the parties themselves, for instance, cannot 
dissolve it by an agreement to do so, or by a denial that it occurred.”175 
The courts are so opposed to the notion of common law divorce 
that many have outright rejected any argument that would 
approximate recognition of common law divorce. For instance, in In re 
Marriage of Brooks,176 Harry and Maureen Brooks married in 1950, 
separated in 1965, and officially divorced in 1978.177 During the divorce 
proceedings, Harry objected to the court’s classifying as “marital 
property” the property he had acquired after their separation.178 The 
court, however, rejected this argument, writing that “Harry’s 
suggestion that the date of the parties’ separation should be used as the 
termination date of Maureen’s marital property rights is baseless. For 
us to hold that a de facto termination extinguishes marital property 
rights would create, in effect, ‘common law divorce.’”179 According to 
the court, “[l]aw and policy will not support such a result.”180 
Such cases offer a glimpse into the reasoning behind the law’s 
refusal to sanction common law divorce. Aside from the enormous 
evidentiary benefit of obtaining a formal divorce decree, public policy 
demands that divorces play out under the supervision of a court of law 
to ensure that each spouse’s contributions to the marriage are fully 
taken into account and fairly compensated. As discussed in greater 
detail below, family law is generally reluctant to allow divorcing 
couples to make settlement agreements on their own—as they would 
have to do in a common law divorce—because, “[d]espite the 
resemblance that marriage bears to a business partnership, the marital 
relationship is not . . . an unalloyed example of free-market 
principles.”181 Courts recognize that people in an emotional 
 
 174. Id. at 880. 
 175. Chivers v. Couch Motor Lines, Inc., 159 So. 2d 544, 550 (La. 1964). 
 176. In re Marriage of Brooks, 486 N.E.2d 267 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). 
 177. Id. at 269. 
 178. Id. at 271. 
 179. Id. at 272. 
 180. Id.; accord In re Marriage of Morris, 640 N.E.2d 344, 347 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). 
 181. POSNER, supra note 156, § 5.2, at 164; see also Louis E. Wolcher, “The Enchantress” and 
Karl Polanyi’s Social Theory, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1243, 1261 (1990) (“Marriage in its typical form is 
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relationship are not “dealing at arm’s length,” so the presence of the 
court is warranted to help safeguard the economic interests of the two 
parties.182 If we return to the prisoner’s dilemma, it becomes clear that 
states understand that giving couples the option of informal divorce 
incentivizes behavior that leads to situations where one or both parties 
is economically harmed. Such harm, in turn, compromises the state’s 
interest in safeguarding the health and wellbeing of its citizens. States 
therefore refuse to sanction common law divorce, making it more likely 
that couples who wish to dissolve their marriage will involve the state 
in that process, even if only to protect their own economic interests. 
2. Review of Settlement Agreements.  In general, courts view all 
domestic agreements with some degree of skepticism.183 When it comes 
to prenuptial agreements, for example, courts routinely review them 
for unconscionability, require the parties to disclose the nature and 
extent of their assets before entering into such agreements, and may 
even set aside such agreements when the circumstances of the parties 
have changed so drastically as to render application of the agreement 
inequitable.184 Thus, although prenuptial agreements “must adhere to 
the normal rules of contract,”185 such agreements “remain more 
vulnerable to attack than commercial contracts because of special 
standards that govern their enforcement.”186 
Concerned with protecting the rights and benefits of divorcing 
spouses, courts have treated settlement agreements in a similar fashion. 
As an initial matter, courts prefer that divorcing couples come to an 
agreement on their own regarding the terms of the divorce.187 After all, 
if the parties can themselves agree, then the divorce is less likely to be 
 
arguably one of the most emotional and relational, and least rational and individualistic, of all 
human transactions.”).  
 182. See infra notes 313–19 and accompanying text. 
 183. See Brian Bix, Domestic Agreements, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1753, 1771 (2007) (“The law 
has always been skeptical of contracts between intimates . . . .”). 
 184. See Brod, supra note 143, at 254, 260. 
 185. Allison A. Marston, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial Agreements, 49 STAN. 
L. REV. 887, 898 (1997). 
 186. Id.; see also Recent Developments, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1399 (1991) (“In general, 
state courts have refused to treat prenuptial agreements like other contracts, and have enforced 
them only if they meet local tests of procedural and substantive fairness.”). 
 187. Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition of Gender in the Law: Revaluing the 
Caretaker Role, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 14 (2008) (“Generally, courts encourage divorcing 
couples individually to craft separation agreements regarding the incidents of divorce (except 
agreements involving child support, visitation and custody) . . . .”); see also UNIF. MARRIAGE 
AND DIVORCE ACT § 306(e) (NAT’L. CONFERENCE OF COMM’R ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1970). 
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acrimonious. Additionally, the final product is more likely to reflect 
the true preferences of the parties than would an adjudicated result.188 
Still, courts recognize the possibility of overreaching and even 
coercion, and do not give couples carte blanche when it comes to such 
agreements. Instead, “[a]t the final hearing most jurisdictions require 
the judge to review settlement agreements for unfairness or 
unconscionability.”189 As Professor Sally Burnett Sharp explains: 
[I]t is commonly said that a settlement agreement, like any other 
contract, must be free from any fraud, duress, undue influence, or 
overreaching of any kind. Most states, however, impose as an 
additional safeguard the requirement that an agreement be submitted 
to a court for its approval and that it cannot be merged or 
incorporated into the final decree without such approval. Judicial 
approval, at least in theory, will be withheld unless the court finds that 
the proposed agreement is equitable, or fair and reasonable, or not 
unconscionable.190 
Although there is some debate about just how meaningful these 
protections really are,191 their existence nonetheless points to the law’s 
awareness of the harm that can result from a lack of judicial oversight. 
As one court wrote, “an agreement in anticipation of divorce is not the 
same as any ordinary contract. [Although] [p]ublic policy favors parties 
settling their own disputes in a divorce . . . the family court has a 
statutorily authorized role . . . [in] assur[ing] a fair and equitable 
dissolution of the state-sanctioned institution of marriage.”192 
Courts take this role so seriously that, even when both sides are 
represented by counsel, the court retains the right to set aside a 
 
 188. See generally Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and 
Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339 (1994) (advocating a more critical approach for 
evaluating the merits of settlements). 
 189. Penelope Eileen Bryan, Women’s Freedom To Contract at Divorce: A Mask for 
Contextual Coercion, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1153, 1239 (1999). 
 190. Sally Burnett Sharp, Fairness Standards and Separation Agreements: A Word of Caution 
on Contractual Freedom, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1407 (1984).  
 191. Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargaining and the Ethics of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 
569 (1989) (“R]eview of divorce agreements often has been perfunctory. Evidence of patent 
misconduct, such as fraud or concealment, is generally necessary to attract judicial 
intervention.”); Sharp, supra note 190, at 1407 (“[J]udicial review requirements as currently 
applied by courts fail in any event to provide a meaningful review for either substantive or 
procedural fairness.”); see also Bryan, supra note 189, at 1238–39 (noting that “[w]hat review does 
occur seems directed more to whether the parties voluntarily agreed to the settlement than to the 
settlement’s substance”). 
 192. Pouech v. Pouech, 904 A.2d 70, 77–78 (Vt. 2006). 
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settlement agreement that it deems inequitable to one of the parties. 
For example, in Bellow v. Bellow,193 the court set aside a settlement 
agreement that failed to refer to a $10,000 account that the husband 
had withdrawn, incorrectly classified a jointly owned apartment as the 
separate property of the husband, and estimated the husband’s income 
to be $30,000 when it was in fact $150,000.194 In so ruling, the court 
noted that “[i]n reaching our decision we are aware the plaintiff had 
the benefit of able counsel all through the proceedings [and] [w]e are 
reluctant to overturn the property settlement voluntarily entered into 
. . . . Nevertheless, we find there is evidence to support the judgment of 
the trial court,” which had determined that the settlement agreement 
leads to an “inequitable result.”195 
Taken together, the absence of common law divorce and the 
requisite judicial review for settlement agreements reveal that divorce 
is an essential legal tool for the state’s protection of former spouses. 
Moreover, these mechanisms also serve as an incentive to participate 
in the formal divorce process in the first place—individuals who 
question whether they are leaving the marriage with everything to 
which they are entitled would invoke the protections of the court to 
obtain greater assurances on that front and an enforceable order to that 
effect. In other words, that divorce is a legal option provides an 
incentive to ignore thoughts of an informal settlement and instead elect 
to pursue a formal divorce in the hopes of achieving a more personally 
beneficial outcome. 
B. Protections for Future Spouses 
Divorce protects subsequent spouses from the ever-present 
possibility of desertion, which can harm subsequent spouses as much 
as it does deserted spouses. For while no state permits common law 
divorce, nothing prevents a married couple from simply going their 
separate ways without officially divorcing. This option is often dubbed 
“the poor man’s divorce,”196 given its appeal to those for whom a 
divorce proceeding is simply too costly: 
  Historically, the cost of lawyers and court fees, the bewildering 
 
 193. Bellow v. Bellow, 352 N.E.2d 427 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976). 
 194. Id. at 429. 
 195. Id. at 432.  
 196. Sidney B. Jacoby, Legal Aid to the Poor, 53 HARV. L. REV. 940, 957 (1940) (“[D]esertion 
is called in popular speech the ‘poor man’s divorce’ due to the practical inability of many poor 
persons to obtain a divorce.”). 
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jargon of “complaints” and “cross-complaints,” the time-consuming 
and seemingly complex legal process, and the popular association of 
courts with crime, have served to dissuaded the poor from seeking 
legal divorce. At the point of breakup it often seems much easier 
simply to separate—or for the man to desert—than go through the 
hassles and traumas of legal divorce.197 
To put it more simply, “owing to strained finances and a lack of legal 
assistance,” some individuals “often forgo divorce and dissolve their 
marriages informally.”198 
Given the harms that can befall an individual whose marriage ends 
without an adjudication of the spouses’ respective rights and 
obligations, desertion is an undesirable way to effectuate separation.199 
The law therefore actively attempts to encourage formal divorce,200 and 
one of the most powerful incentives provided by the law is the rule that 
a person can only have one spouse at a time.201 Parties may informally 
separate, but once either of them wishes to remarry, he or she must 
obtain a divorce from the first spouse. “Going through the formal 
divorce process is a condition precedent to the taking of a second wife 
or husband.”202 
Despite this requirement, “a significant segment of our society 
utilizes desertion as a means of dissolving marriages,”203 and some of 
those individuals go on to marry someone else. This illegal second 
marriage presents a tangible problem for the subsequent spouses. As 
one commentator points out, “the real problem develops when . . . they 
decide to remarry and want to make the second marriage work.”204 
Without legally dissolving the first marriage, the second marriage is 
 
 197. LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT: SPOUSES, LOVERS, AND THE LAW 
194 (1981) (“Thus common-law divorce has always been most prevalent among poverty 
subcultures.”). 
 198. Id. at 206. 
 199. See Timothy Follett, In re The Marriage of Ramirez: Sex Lies, and California’s 
Annulment for Fraud Based on Fidelity, 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 433, 455 (2013) (“[D]ivorce 
proceedings protect marriage by recognizing that the marriage existed and then enforcing the 
rights and obligations of the parties that chose to enter into the marriage contract.”). 
 200. See, e.g., Rhonda Wasserman, Parents, Partners, and Personal Jurisdiction, 1995 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 813, 832 (2000) (“Because wives were dependent upon their husbands for support, 
abandoned women would have been left destitute without ex parte divorces.”). 
 201. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 202. Thomas v. LaRosa, 400 S.E.2d 809, 815 (W. Va. 1990). 
 203. Taylor, supra note 25, at 479. 
 204. WEITZMAN, supra note 197, at 194. 
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invalid,205 rendering the parties to the subsequent marriage bereft of 
any spousal protections. And while the bigamous party would be 
exposed to the dangers of potential criminal liability,206 it is that party’s 
second spouse who suffers the real harms. “The invalid marriage 
disqualifies the second spouse from the default protection marriage 
provides a (legitimate) surviving spouse, while the [first,] lawful 
marriage simultaneously protects the valid marriage partner’s interest 
and prevents the bigamous partner from profiting from the illegitimacy 
of the marriage.”207 
Given the harms that accrue to subsequent, legally invalid spouses, 
the courts have developed three doctrines to protect them: the 
subsequent marriage presumption, the marriage by estoppel doctrine, 
and the putative spouse doctrine. As will be described in the next 
sections, each doctrine is used to safeguard the protections that would 
have naturally accrued had the bigamous spouse obtained a valid 
divorce prior to the second marriage. 
1. Subsequent Marriage Presumption.  Suppose that Henry 
married Catherine but subsequently moved out and married Anne.208 
Unhappy with Anne, he deserted her and married Jane. At no point 
does he file for divorce from either Catherine or Anne. Henry then 
dies, leaving a rather large fortune. Not surprisingly, Catherine, Anne, 
and Jane all come forward claiming to be Henry’s wife. A problem thus 
arises—who is Henry’s legal wife? Many would assume the answer to 
be Catherine. After all, until he divorced his first wife, all subsequent 
“marriages” would be void. In most instances, however, the correct 
response would be just the opposite—Jane would prevail. 
Jane would owe her victory to what is frequently described as “the 
strongest presumption[] in the law”209—namely, the subsequent or last-
in-time marriage presumption. Using this presumption, courts presume 
 
 205. Dorsey v. Dorsey, 66 So. 2d 135, 139 (Ala. 1953) (“A woman can have but one lawful 
husband living, and so long as he is alive and the marriage bond remains in full force, all her 
subsequent marriages, whether meretricious or founded in mistake and at the time supposed to 
be lawful, are utterly null and void.”).  
 206. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 207. Lynne Marie Kohm, Why Marriage is Still the Best Default in Estate Planning Conflicts, 
117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1219, 1231 (2013). 
 208. In all the hypotheticals contained in this Article, the parties take their names from those 
involved in the fascinating history of Henry VIII and his six wives. See generally ALISON WEIR, 
THE SIX WIVES OF HENRY VIII (1991). 
 209. Smith v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 1284, 1285 (11th Cir. 1983); see also Vaughan v. Vaughan, 195 
Miss. 463, 471 (1943) (describing the presumption as “one of the strongest known to the law”).  
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“that any former marriage was terminated by death, annulment, or 
divorce”210 and assume that a person’s most recent marriage is the one 
that is legally valid. The burden then shifts to the former spouse to 
prove that their marriage was never legally terminated.211 
What might sound like a rather easy burden to meet is nearly 
impossible. After all, “a prior spouse will only be able to rebut this last-
in-time marriage presumption by searching all of the divorce records 
where the deceased spouse resided—or could have resided—in order 
to prove that no divorce decree was ever granted to the deceased 
spouse.”212 As one court described the required burden of proof, 
“every reasonable possibility of validity must be negatived, and . . . the 
evidence to overcome the presumption of validity of the subsequent 
marriage must be clear, strong, and satisfactory and so persuasive as to 
leave no room for reasonable doubt.”213 
An illustration of this onerous burden can be found in the 1951 
case of United States v. Burns.214 Lillie Harris Burns married Elisha 
Burns in Mississippi in 1928, but after the couple moved to Missouri, 
Elisha left her for another woman, Rosie Lee Liverson.215 Lillie Harris 
then moved to Arkansas, never divorced Elisha, and likewise never 
received notice that he had filed for divorce from her.216 Nonetheless, 
Elisha and Rosie Lee married in 1943.217 When Elisha died, both 
women came forward claiming to be Elisha’s surviving spouse in order 
to obtain the proceeds of his insurance policy.218 The court applied the 
subsequent marriage presumption, stating that the burden was on Lillie 
(as the first-in-time spouse) “to prove by clear and decisive evidence 
 
 210. Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law, Husband & Wife, 49 SMU L. REV. 1015, 1018 n.17 
(1996). 
 211. See Parker v. Am. Lumber Co., 56 S.E.2d 214, 216 (Va. 1949) (“[T]he second marriage is 
presumed valid; such presumption is stronger than and overcomes the presumption of the 
continuance of the first marriage, so that a person who attacks a second marriage has the burden 
of producing evidence of its invalidity.”). 
 212. Peter Nash Swisher & Melanie Diana Jones, The Last-in-Time Marriage Presumption, 29 
FAM. L.Q. 409, 410 n.3 (1995) (emphasis added). 
 213. Harper v. Dupree, 345 P.2d 644, 647 (Kan. 1959) (“In other words, it is said that the 
burden of proving that a divorce has not been granted to either party to a former marriage is 
substantial and is not met by proof of facts from which mere inferences may be drawn.”). 
 214. United States v. Burns, 95 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Ark. 1951). 
 215. Id. at 629. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. Lillie likewise remarried a man named Fred Hamilton, but several years after their 
marriage, he learned of Elisha and left Lille. Id. 
 218. Id.  
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that neither party had obtained a divorce.”219 Although the court 
recognized the difficulty imposed by such a burden, which essentially 
required Lillie “to prove a negative,”220 it nonetheless ruled that the 
high burden was necessary “to overcome the sacred and stalwart 
presumption protecting the marriage state.”221 Lillie attempted to 
satisfy her burden by producing “certificates from the clerks of 
counties where Elisha was supposed to have lived since the date of her 
marriage to him, showing that by proper search of the records no 
record was found of any divorce granted to either Elisha Burns or Lillie 
Harris Burns during his lifetime.”222 But unfortunately for Lillie, she 
neglected to search one particular county. The court pointed out that 
“it is in evidence that after Elisha left [Lillie] he lived in St. Francis 
County, Arkansas, and no certificate was furnished for that county.”223 
For that reason, Lillie’s claim failed, and she was denied the proceeds 
of Elisha’s insurance policy.224 
In essence, the subsequent marriage presumption operates by 
presuming a divorce, when in fact, one likely never occurred. There are 
several policy-based motivations underlying this presumption, the first 
of which is to protect the family,225 particularly the children of the 
various relationships. For instance, looking back at the earlier 
hypothetical, assume that Henry had one child each with Catherine, 
Anne, and Jane. To treat his marriage to Catherine as the only valid 
marriage would mean that the children borne to Anne and Jane would 
be considered nonmarital or—to use the outdated, more pejorative 
term—illegitimate. On the contrary, to assume that each subsequent 
marriage was instead valid, each child would be considered 
legitimate.226 Because distinctions based on legitimacy have 
 
 219. Id. at 630 (citing Mo. Pac. R.R. v. Harris, 120 S.W.2d 695, 696 (Ark. 1938)). 
 220. Id.; see also Swisher & Jones, supra note 212, at 430 n.170 (“It is generally recognized 
that in many fact situations these elements place a heavy, sometimes an impossible, burden on 
the attacker to prove two negatives—no death and no divorce.”). 
 221. Burns, 95 F. Supp. at 630. 
 222. Id. at 629. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 630 (“Having failed to produce the required quality of evidence she must be 
deemed to have failed to make good her claim.”). 
 225. See Tatum v. Tatum, 201 F.2d 401, 406 (9th Cir. 1957) (noting that one of the policy 
rationales for the presumption is “to protect and strengthen the social and moral standards of the 
community”). 
 226. See, e.g., Fowler v. Tex. Expl. Co., 290 S.W. 818, 822 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) (noting that 
the presumption “should always be indulged [but] especially when such presumption is necessary 
to protect the legitimacy of children”). 
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increasingly died away, such protection may seem less important 
today.227 Nonetheless, legitimacy remains one of the historic 
justifications for the presumption. 
A second, more important motivation is the degree to which the 
subsequent marriage presumption protects the parties’ expectations 
and the subsequent spouses’ welfare. The deceased likely considered 
his most recent spouse his actual spouse, to whom he would confer all 
the accompanying rights and benefits of marriage.228 
Last is the states’ interest in “protecting apparent spouses in 
economically vulnerable positions from becoming welfare 
recipients.”229 As noted earlier, numerous benefits attend marriage.230 
Were it not for the subsequent marriage presumption, individuals like 
Jane would be denied all those protections and benefits simply because 
she had the misfortune of marrying someone who failed to divorce a 
previous spouse. And those previous spouses (Catherine and Anne in 
our hypothetical) are likely much less in need of protection because 
they have—ostensibly, at least—been living without Henry for some 
time.231 
Given these “strong and persuasive underlying public policy 
rationales,” a vast majority of jurisdictions continue to recognize and 
apply the subsequent marriage protection as a means of safeguarding 
the protections that would otherwise flow from legal divorce.232  
2. Marriage by Estoppel.  Suppose instead that Henry only had one 
wife, Catherine, but she was previously married to someone else, 
Arthur.233 Suppose further that, before she even met Henry, Catherine 
 
 227. See Swisher & Jones, supra note 212, at 414. 
 228. See, e.g., Rainer v. Snider, 369 N.E.2d 666, 669 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (“The presumption 
rests upon strong social policies which give effect to the expectations of the parties.”); 
McClaugherty v. McClaugherty, 21 S.E.2d 761, 765 (Va. 1945) (“While it is true, however, that 
cohabitation and repute do not constitute marriage, they do constitute strong evidence tending to 
raise a presumption of marriage, and the burden is on him who denies the marriage to offer 
countervailing evidence.”). 
 229. See Swisher & Jones, supra note 212, at 414. 
 230. See supra notes 146–48 and accompanying text. 
 231. See RANDY FRANCES KANDEL, FAMILY LAW: ESSENTIAL TERMS AND CONCEPTS 27 
(2000) (“The first spouse, whether validly divorced or not, has been separated from the decedent 
socially and financially for an extended time, has survived in other ways, and is less likely to be 
expecting such benefits.”). 
 232. See Swisher & Jones, supra note 212, at 414–15 (describing the number of jurisdictions 
as “overwhelming”). 
 233. Interestingly enough, Henry VIII’s first wife, Catherine of Aragon, was indeed 
previously married to Arthur, Henry VIII’s older brother. It was Arthur who was originally heir 
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divorced Arthur, but the divorce was invalid for some reason. So when 
Henry files for divorce from Catherine, she counters that the two were 
never legally married, citing the fact that her previous marriage to 
Arthur was never properly dissolved. Many people would likely 
assume that Catherine’s argument would prevail—a person can only 
have one spouse at a time and Catherine’s previous marriage remains 
legally in effect. Instead, Henry would likely prevail by using the 
doctrine of marriage by estoppel. 
Traditionally, equitable estoppel requires “(1) action or nonaction 
[by one person] which induces (2) reliance by another (3) to his 
detriment.”234 In cases like Catherine’s, those elements would rarely be 
satisfied. To the extent that Catherine’s invalid divorce would operate 
as a detriment to her, it is one that she herself created—Henry played 
no role. In fact, the only role Henry played was to enter into a 
purported marriage with Catherine. Traditional equitable estoppel 
actually allows individuals like Henry to rely on a prior invalid divorce 
to divest individuals like Catherine of all the rights they thought they 
had acquired in the subsequent marriage. 
Once again recognizing the extreme harm that can result from 
reliance on an invalid marriage, family law provides a solution: the 
courts apply equitable estoppel differently when one spouse attempts 
to rely on a previous, invalid divorce. Marriage by estoppel, as the 
doctrine has come to be called, “is unlike classic equitable estoppel in 
that it does not focus solely on whether one party has made a 
misrepresentation on which the other has reasonably relied.”235 
Instead, “[t]he focus is broader and requires a consideration of all of 
 
to the English throne, and he married Catherine when he was just fifteen years of age. When he 
unexpectedly died just a few months later, Henry became the heir and, like his brother before 
him, took Catherine for his wife. See generally SEAN CUNNINGHAM, PRINCE ARTHUR: THE 
TUDOR KING WHO NEVER WAS (2016). Even more interesting is the fact that it was this previous 
marriage that provided Henry with the ammunition to ultimately annul his marriage to Catherine. 
Specifically, “[s]he was his brother’s wife, and, under ecclesiastical law, their sexual relationship 
was considered incest. After Catherine had undergone numerous miscarriages and stillbirths, 
Henry became convinced that God was punishing him for his incestuous marriage to her, and he 
sought an annulment in 1525.” CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY OF DIVORCE, supra note 166, at 678. 
 234. Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood To Meet 
the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 491 
(1990); see also Homer Clark, Estoppel Against Jurisdictional Attack on Decrees of Divorce, 70 
YALE L.J. 45, 57 (1960) (defining equitable estoppel as a doctrine in which “one who has taken a 
position with reference to a transaction and thereby obtained a benefit or brought about a change 
of position in the other party to the transaction cannot later take an inconsistent position which 
would prejudice the other party”).  
 235. Lowenschuss v. Lowenschuss, 579 A.2d 377, 381 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). 
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the circumstances surrounding not only the procurement of the 
divorce, but also the conduct of the parties thereafter and the effect of 
a declaration of the invalidity of the divorce on others.”236 Stated more 
simply, “[a] person may be precluded from attacking the validity of a 
foreign divorce decree if, under the circumstances, it would be 
inequitable for him to do so.”237 
Consider the case of Lowenschuss v. Lowenschuss.238 There, 
Pennsylvania resident Beverly Lowenschuss divorced her first husband 
in 1964 by traveling to Alabama, where she remained only so long as 
was necessary to obtain a divorce decree. Because she failed to 
establish residency in Alabama, though, her divorce was invalid.239 Not 
realizing that she had failed to effectuate a legal divorce, Beverly 
returned to Pennsylvania, where she met and married Fred 
Lowenschuss.240 The couple eventually had four children together.241 
Fred testified that he learned of Beverly’s defective divorce in 1974, 
but he also testified that, from that point on, they nonetheless 
“continued to live the same way as before.”242 In 1981, Beverly filed for 
divorce, but Fred defended by citing Beverly’s invalid Alabama 
divorce, arguing that, on that basis, he and Beverly were never legally 
married.243 The court refused to allow Fred to even raise the 
circumstances of Beverly’s previous divorce. 
Even though Fred was not a party to her prior divorce 
proceedings, the court ruled that, in light of his conduct, it would be 
inequitable for him to raise that defense at this late date. Both parties 
“relied in good faith on the Alabama divorce in marrying each other in 
1965 and continued to rely on that divorce at minimum until 1974. . . . 
Husband conducted himself as a married man for nine years before 
 
 236. Id.; see also JOHN DE WITT GREGORY, PETER N. SWISHER & ROBIN FRETWELL 
WILSON, UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 39 (2013) (“It is sufficient, in many cases, that a court 
find only that it would be unfair to let a party take advantage of the legal invalidity of a divorce 
decree and the invalidity of the subsequent marriage.”).  
 237. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 74 (AM. LAW INST. 1971). 
 238. Lowenschuss v. Lowenschuss, 579 A.2d 377 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). 
 239. Id. at 378 (“Wife spent at most two days in Alabama and does not dispute the fact that 
she has never been a bona fide resident of Alabama.”). 
 240. Id. (“Husband knew that wife was divorced, but denies knowing any of the details 
concerning how the divorce was procured.”). 
 241. Id.  
 242. Id. at 379. Fred had commenced his own divorce action in 1974, but subsequently 
withdrew it when, according to him, he learned of the defective divorce; however, Beverly 
testified that it was withdrawn because the two reconciled. Id. at 378–79. 
 243. Id. at 377. 
HIGDON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/25/2017  11:59 AM 
2017] POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGE 121 
1974 and after 1974 he continued to live as he had before.”244 
Ultimately, the court found that: 
[n]o social purpose will be served by a decision that this marriage 
simply does not exist and that wife is still the legal wife of her first 
husband and that her four children were born of an illicit relationship. 
To hold that husband may now raise this challenge simply in order to 
avoid the financial obligations of his marriage would be grossly 
inequitable.245 
To justify its ruling, the court reiterated the important and protective 
function of divorce, writing that “a decision which would allow 
husband to avoid his marital obligations at this late juncture would be 
completely inconsistent with the Commonwealth’s contemporary 
attitude toward divorce, which is grounded in the application of 
equitable principles to achieve economic justice and overall fairness 
between the parties.”246 
3. Putative Marriage.  Returning to the first hypothetical, assume 
that Anne—Henry’s second wife—defeats the subsequent marriage 
presumption to the detriment of Jane—Henry’s third wife. Were that 
to happen, one might assume that Jane would be left without any of 
the protections of marriage, no better off from a property perspective 
than a longtime roommate. Once again, this assumption would prove 
incorrect. Family law has one additional weapon in its arsenal to 
protect a subsequent spouse who learns that she was never in fact 
legally wed: the putative marriage doctrine.247 
To understand how it operates, consider the limitations of the two 
doctrines discussed above. Both the marriage by estoppel doctrine and 
the subsequent marriage presumption conjure up a valid divorce 
where, factually, none likely exists. They do so either by presuming the 
existence of a valid divorce that cannot easily be disproven248 or, when 
faced with evidence of a prior divorce that was clearly invalid, by 
 
 244. Id. at 385. The court also noted that there was “no evidence that wife had any knowledge 
that her Alabama divorce was invalid and an impediment to a valid Pennsylvania marriage when 
she married husband.” Id. Further, “the Alabama judge who granted wife her divorce was later 
convicted of representing to out of state residents that they could obtain valid Alabama divorces.” 
Id. 
 245. Id. at 386. 
 246. Id.  
 247. See generally Christopher L. Blakesley, The Putative Marriage Doctrine, 60 TUL. L. REV. 
1 (1985) (detailing the historical evolution of the doctrine and its basic components). 
 248. See supra Part III.B.1. 
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preventing parties from using that divorce as a means of defeating the 
validity of their subsequent marriage.249 The putative marriage 
doctrine goes one step further in protecting subsequent spouses, 
protecting those who entered into a “marriage” in good faith even 
where the court cannot create a valid divorce to salvage the subsequent 
marriage. 
Essentially, the putative marriage doctrine provides the civil 
effects of marriage to one who in good faith entered into a marriage 
that is later revealed to be invalid.250 In other words, “[a] putative 
marriage . . . is a marriage which is in reality null, but which allows the 
civil effects of a valid marriage to flow to the party or parties who 
contracted it in good faith.”251 The only requirements parties must meet 
to avail themselves of this protection is to have had a ceremonial 
marriage and to have done so in good faith that the marriage would be 
valid—good faith defined as “ignoran[ce] of the cause which prevents 
the formation of the marriage or the defects in its celebration which 
caused its nullity.”252 
Like the subsequent marriage presumption and the marriage by 
estoppel doctrine, the putative marriage doctrine is intended to protect 
innocent spouses—including mistaken bigamists, who innocently but 
erroneously believe that they obtained a valid divorce prior to 
remarrying—and promote equity. As one court explained, “[A] 
marriage contracted when one spouse is a party to a previously 
undissolved marriage is absolutely null; however, equity demands that 
innocent persons not be injured through an innocent relationship.”253 
As Professor Christopher Blakesley points out, the primary motivation 
behind this doctrine is the desire to ensure fairness. “The putative 
marriage doctrine is a device developed to ameliorate or correct the 
injustice which would occur if civil effects were not allowed to flow to 
a party to a null marriage who believes in good faith that he or she is 
 
 249. See supra Part.III.B.2. 
 250. See Monica Hof Wallace, The Pitfalls of a Putative Marriage and the Call for a Putative 
Divorce, 64 LA. L. REV. 71, 73 (2003) (“The putative marriage rule provides the proverbial bridge 
to civil effects in the event parties fail in their attempt to contract a valid marriage, believing in 
good faith they had done so.”). 
 251. Blakesley, supra note 247, at 6. 
 252. Succession of Marinoni, 164 So. 797, 804 (La. 1935) (quoting 1 M. PLANIOL, TRAITÉ 
ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL, no. 1096 (3d ed.)); see also Saacks v. Saacks, 96-736, p. 6 (La. 
App. 5 Cir. 1/28/97); 688 So. 2d 673, 676 (defining “good faith” as “an honest and reasonable belief 
that the marriage was valid and that no legal impediment to it existed”). 
 253. Lee v. Hunt, 483 F. Supp. 826, 842 (W.D. La. 1978). 
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validly married.”254 Because “[u]nless some protective or corrective 
measure intercedes, the normal civil effects of marriage simply do not 
flow from a marriage which is null.”255 
The 2004 Nevada case of Williams v. Williams is exemplary.256 
Richard and Marcie Williams married in 1973 and lived together as 
husband and wife for the next twenty-seven years, at which time 
Richard learned that Marcie had never divorced her first husband.257 
As a result, Richard filed an annulment action to declare his marriage 
to Marcie void.258 The case provided Nevada with its first opportunity 
to adopt the putative spouse doctrine: 
We have not previously considered the putative spouse doctrine, but 
we are persuaded by the rationale of our sister states that public 
policy supports adopting the doctrine in Nevada. Fairness and equity 
favor recognizing putative spouses when parties enter into a marriage 
ceremony in good faith and without knowledge that there is a factual 
or legal impediment to their marriage. . . . As a majority of our sister 
states have recognized, the sanctity of marriage is not undermined, 
but rather enhanced, by the recognition of the putative spouse 
doctrine. We therefore adopt the doctrine in Nevada.259 
Applying the doctrine to the case at hand, the court had little difficulty 
finding that a ceremonial marriage had taken place.260 
A difficulty arose, however, in gauging whether Marcie had 
entered into the marriage in good faith. Her claim was merely “that in 
1971, she ran into [her first husband] at a Reno bus station, where he 
specifically told her that they were divorced and he was living with 
 
 254. Blakesley, supra note 247, at 6. 
 255. Id. at 4; see also Wallace, supra note 250, at 72–73 (“By the general rule, parties who do 
not enter into a valid marriage create no civil contract and therefore are afforded no rights and 
duties of that marriage.”). 
 256. Williams v. Williams, 97 P.3d 1124 (Nev. 2004) (per curiam). 
 257. Id. at 1126. 
 258. Id. (“Richard testified that had he known Marcie was still married, he would not have 
married her.”). 
 259. Id. at 1128. In reaching this conclusion, the court further noted: 
[The doctrine does not] conflict with Nevada’s policy [of] refusing to recognize 
common-law marriages or palimony suits [because, in situations involving] the putative 
spouse doctrine, the parties have actually attempted to enter into a formal relationship 
with the solemnization of a marriage ceremony, a missing element in common-law 
marriages and palimony suits.  
Id. 
 260. Id. (“The district court found that the parties obtained a license and participated in a 
marriage ceremony on August 26, 1973, in Verdi, Nevada.”).  
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another woman.”261 Richard argued that such reliance was 
unreasonable given that she had never been served with divorce 
papers, and, at the very least, she had a duty to inquire further into the 
existence of the “divorce” before marrying again.262 The court rejected 
Richard’s arguments and ruled in Marcie’s favor, noting at the outset 
that “[g]ood faith is presumed” and that “[t]he party asserting lack of 
good faith has the burden of proving bad faith.”263 Ultimately, the court 
ruled that the lower court was within its discretion in finding that 
Marcie had entered into the marriage in good faith given that 
“substantial evidence supports the district court’s finding that Marcie 
did not act unreasonably in relying upon Allmaras’ representations. 
The record reflects no reason for Marcie to have disbelieved him and, 
thus, no reason to have investigated the truth of his representations.”264 
In ruling as it did, the court also made note of Marcie’s financial 
circumstances: 
  During the 27 years that the parties believed themselves to be 
married, Marcie was a homemaker and a mother. From 1981 to 1999, 
Marcie was a licensed child-care provider for six children. During that 
time, she earned $460 a week. At trial, Marcie had a certificate of 
General Educational Development (G.E.D.) and earned $8.50 an 
hour at a retirement home. She was 63 years old and lived with her 
daughter because she could not afford to live on her own. . . . 
  . . . . 
  . . . The district court found that Marcie had limited ability to 
support herself.265 
Implicit in this recitation is the court’s awareness of the degree to which 
Marcie would be harmed if forced to walk away from a twenty-seven-
year relationship with no property rights flowing from what she 
believed was a valid marriage. By finding that Marcie was a putative 
spouse, the property acquired during her marriage to Richard was 
 
 261. Id. at 1127. 
 262. Id. at 1129. 
 263. Id. at 1128; see also Succession of Zinsel, 360 So. 2d 587, 592 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (“[G]ood 
faith is presumed to exist in favor of a party claiming to be a putative spouse who, free of her own 
impediment, enters into the marriage and the burden of proving the lack of good faith is upon the 
party attacking the marriage.”). 
 264. Williams, 97 P.3d at 1129. The court then noted that “[a]lthough older case law suggests 
that a party cannot rely on a former spouse’s representation of divorce, more recent cases indicate 
this is just a factor for the judge to consider in determining good faith.” Id. 
 265. Id. at 1127. 
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labeled quasi-community property and divided equally between 
them.266 
In sum, when two people enter into a marriage, but one of those 
individuals is still legally married to someone else, the results can be 
devastating for the subsequent spouse who later learns that his 
“marriage”—and all the accompanying protections he thought he 
enjoyed—never legally existed. The state is likewise harmed because it 
“becomes responsible for supporting a spouse if the divorce settlement 
does not provide financial security.”267 The three doctrines discussed 
above were developed to help avoid such harms. These “alternative 
constructs and regulations are used to protect vulnerable parties in 
long-term cohabitant relationships.”268 
Most importantly, each of those doctrines derive their 
effectiveness from the fact that the law currently only allows a person 
to have one spouse at any given time. As the next section discusses, 
should that numerical limitation go away, new harms would emerge, 
and these doctrines would be powerless to stop them. 
IV. THE EX ANTE COSTS OF LEGALIZING POLYGAMY 
This Article argues that, even assuming that the right to marry did 
include plural marriage, the state’s interest in promoting divorce 
among separating couples is nonetheless a compelling justification 
requiring nothing short of a complete ban on polygamy. As noted in 
the Introduction, there are times when the law attempts to neutralize 
the harmful results that can arise from prisoner’s dilemmas by 
discouraging cooperation between “prisoners.” The law of divorce is 
one such example. Specifically, to prevent spouses from cooperating in 
a scheme wherein they eschew divorce in favor of informal separation, 
the law provides a number of inducements directed at both parties, 
increasing the likelihood that at least one of them will defect from any 
such scheme and instead opt to formally dissolve the marriage.269 As 
explained more fully below, legalizing polygamy would remove one of 
 
 266. Id. at 1129–30 (“Community property states that recognize the putative spouse doctrine 
apply community property principles to the division of property, including determinations of what 
constitutes community and separate property. . . . We agree with this reasoning.”). 
 267. Carolyn Counce, Family Law—Cary v. Cary: Antenuptial Agreements Waiving or 
Limiting Alimony in Tennessee, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 1041, 1043 (1997). 
 268. See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles & Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Between Function and Form: 
Towards a Differentiated Model of Functional Parenthood, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 419, 453 
(2013) (noting alternatives to traditional common law marriage). 
 269. See infra Part IV.A. 
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the strongest incentives—the threat of a bigamy prosecution—for 
married couples to formally divorce, thus making formal divorce less 
likely among separating couples and consequently undermining the 
various protections the law of divorce has been carefully crafted to 
safeguard. 
One might ask why contemporary law should be concerned with 
polygamy given that the practice of plural marriage is, and always has 
been, banned throughout the country. The answer is that, regardless of 
its current legal status, plural marriage nonetheless continues to exist 
within the United States.270 Such marriages are, of course, legally 
invalid and those who practice polygamy are subject to criminal 
prosecution.271 Nonetheless, the institution has persevered, and some 
argue that the practice is even growing.272 Although the Supreme Court 
has upheld these prohibitions in the face of First Amendment 
challenges,273 it has never had occasion to address whether a right to 
polygamy exists under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Given the recent success of a similar challenge to the 
states’ ban on same-sex marriage274 and the fact that, for political 
reasons, no state is likely to legalize polygamy in the near future, an 
argument that plural marriage falls within the ambit of the 
fundamental right to marry is likely the strongest basis at present for 
reversing the United States’ longstanding ban on polygamy. 
The problem, however, is that even if one could successfully 
convince the Court that the right to marry likewise includes the right 
to polygamy, the states’ prohibitions on the practice would nonetheless 
survive a constitutional challenge so long as a state could demonstrate 
that, first, it has a “compelling interest” to justify the restrictions and, 
second, that those restrictions do not “unnecessarily burden or restrict 
constitutionally protected activity.”275 It is the interest in requiring and 
promoting divorce among separating couples that provides the 
requisite state interest in justifying an absolute prohibition on 
polygamy. After all, as discussed more fully below, even attempts to 
distinguish polygamy from bigamy would fail to safeguard this 
 
 270. See supra Part I. 
 271. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 272. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 273. See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text. 
 274. See supra notes 123–38 and accompanying text. 
 275. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 760 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing strict 
scrutiny). 
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overriding interest on the part of the state.276 
Although other scholars have discussed the impacts of legalizing 
polygamy,277 they have done so by focusing exclusively on how the 
practice would impact those who affirmatively seek to engage in plural 
marriage as that practice is traditionally understood. In contrast, this 
Article focuses, not on polygamists, but on sequential bigamists—that 
is, those who will marry more than once but never with the intent of 
having more than one spouse at a time—and the ex ante consequences 
that the legalization of polygamy would have on their marriages. 
Looking at polygamy through this lens makes much clearer the dangers 
to the state and the necessity of an absolute prohibition. 
In developing this argument, this Part first explores the harms that 
would accrue if polygamy were legalized, focusing specifically on the 
economic harms that legal polygamy would pose to spouses, both 
current and subsequent. This Part then addresses some of the possible 
distinctions a state might draw to permit “traditional” polygamy yet 
prohibit sequential bigamy, arguing that none of those legislative 
distinctions would adequately safeguard the state’s interest in 
protecting spouses. 
A. Legalized Polygamy Undermines the States’ Compelling Interest in 
Promoting Divorce Among Separating Spouses 
As discussed earlier, formal divorce furthers the state’s interest in 
safeguarding the economic well-being of its citizens, including those 
who are exiting a marriage and those who may enter into a marriage 
with someone who was married before.278 For those reasons, the state 
has a strong interest in assuring that all are sufficiently incentivized to 
formally divorce and not simply desert the marriage. More specifically, 
the state seeks assurances that the separation adequately and fairly 
provides for the financial needs of each party, that the parties are 
taking from the marriage that to which they are entitled, and that any 
children of the marriage are being fully supported and cared for in a 
way that is in their best interests.279 And when it comes to the poor, the 
 
 276. Requiring that all parties consent to a polygamous marriage, for example, would provide 
no assurances that such consent was not coercively obtained. See infra Part IV.B.  
 277. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 278. See supra Part III. 
 279. See Stephen Cretney, The Law and the Family – Time for Divorce?, 32 COMMON L. 
WORLD REV. 101, 115 (2003) (describing “the arguments for judicial involvement in divorce 
proceedings” as including “that the interests of the children need to be protected, that couples 
need to be properly informed about the consequences of their actions, and that they may benefit 
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state’s interest is particularly acute—the states’ general parens patriae 
role of protecting “all individuals of the state who cannot protect 
themselves” is coupled with the degree to which divorce can further 
erode an individual’s financial stability.280 
Attempting to promote divorce, however, is not an easy job for 
the state. Even in the most amicable of separations, divorce is 
unpleasant. It is emotionally taxing, potentially stigmatizing within 
one’s community, and, most significantly, incredibly expensive. 
Evidence suggests that among poorer Americans, divorce may be so 
expensive that it is essentially unattainable.281 Thus, the incentives that 
the state provides are paramount. After all, beyond those who cannot 
afford to divorce, the question remains—why would any couple elect 
to divorce when they could save themselves a lot of trouble and 
expense by simply going their separate ways? 
The answer lies in the number of legal incentives that the state has 
designed to encourage formal divorce. To begin with, starting a new 
life costs money, so those who leave a marriage do not want to do so 
empty handed; they would prefer to depart with as close to what they 
put into the marriage as they can. Divorce is helpful in that regard as it 
offers an adversarial proceeding with a judge who will independently 
review any agreement the parties reach. For those reasons, divorce—
despite its less attractive qualities—can seem like the best option when 
it comes to helping the parties obtain a better and more equitable 
result. Relatedly, many people will view divorce as an attractive option 
because, after the marriage is formally dissolved, their ex-spouse 
cannot make a claim on any property that they acquire in the future. 
Still, such economic incentives are by themselves insufficient to 
encourage many people who want to permanently separate to formally 
divorce. For those couples who cannot afford a divorce, the property-
based incentives to divorce might not be meaningful.282 The message 
that formal divorce proceedings safeguard property interests, for 
example, is not likely to compel married couples who do not own any 
meaningful property. And even couples who can afford to divorce 
 
from advice and counseling about their personal relationships”).  
 280. See Griffith, supra note 143, at 331 (noting that an analysis for the state’s parens patriae 
power extends beyond children). 
 281. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 282. See Danaya C. Wright, Untying the Knot: An Analysis of the English Divorce and 
Matrimonial Causes Court Records, 1858–1866, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 903, 928–29 (2004) 
(hypothesizing that a low number of separation petitions filed by wives indicates an economic 
inability to continue the suit). 
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might determine that an informal separation agreement would be more 
economically advantageous than a formal divorce. 
Of course, as noted earlier,283 the law cannot always rely 
exclusively on one variety of incentives when it comes to dealing with 
prisoner’s dilemmas. Instead, “[t]he Hobbesian Leviathan that we live 
under needs not only the hammer of contract to uphold promises, but 
also the hammer of mandatory regulation in criminal law, tort law, 
contract law, and other areas of law, regulation that says, ‘Thou shalt 
not.’”284 Laws prohibiting bigamy provide that necessary second 
incentive. When married couples separate, the parties know they 
cannot legally marry another person until they first divorce their 
previous spouse. This requirement lures even those couples that decide 
to informally separate to divorce court once either of them wants to 
remarry. And while it is true that bigamy prosecutions remain 
relatively rare,285 one must presume that most individuals would rather 
not take the chance of being prosecuted for such a crime. This is 
particularly true because bigamy is a crime that carries with it quite a 
bit of social stigma, even for mere allegations.286 That a conviction is 
unlikely is probably little encouragement to those who might publicly 
face such charges. 
Aside the threat of criminal prosecution, the current rule that no 
person may have more than one spouse at any one time also offers 
other, more practical incentives. Specifically, the law offers a plethora 
of rights and benefits reserved exclusively for those who are legally 
 
 283. See supra notes 12–13, 15–18 and accompanying text.  
 284. Wayne Eastman, Ideology and Formality: The Eternal Golden Snarl, 29 CONN. L. REV. 
849, 852 (1997); see also Lynn A. Stout, Judges as Altruistic Hierarchs, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1605, 1617 n.38 (2002) (“[M]ost people seem to try to stay within the constraints of tort law and 
criminal law, even when a cold calculation of costs and benefits suggests they could profit from 
negligent or criminal behavior.”). For instance, the penalties that exist for failing to pay taxes are 
necessary in part because “[n]o one wants to pay taxes because the benefits are so diffuse and the 
costs are so direct. But everyone may be better off if each person has to pay so that each share 
the benefits of schools, roads, and other collective goods.” ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION 
OF COOPERATION 133 (rev. ed. 2006). 
 285. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 286. See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by 
“Unenforced” Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 103 (2000) (listing various harms 
that flow from unenforced sodomy laws). As Professor Leslie argues, “[a] criminal law, though 
not enforced through prosecutions, may still affect society.” Id. Of particular relevance here is 
Professor Leslie’s point that unenforced laws impose “the stigma of criminality.” Id. at 112 
(quoting JOHN D’EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A 
HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940–1970, at 14 (1983)). Presumably, most 
non-polygamists would not only be motivated to divorce by the fear of a bigamy prosecution, but 
also the stigma that would come from simply being accused of bigamy.  
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married.287 The flip side of reserving these benefits for legal spouses is 
that one who thinks himself married and thus relies on those 
protections would be even more harmed if it is later revealed that the 
marriage was invalid.288 Accordingly, even if criminal prohibitions on 
bigamy are insufficient to steer married individuals into divorce court 
before marrying a second spouse, the financial risk to which they are 
exposing their subsequent spouse provides an even more powerful 
incentive. 
If polygamy were to become legal, however, the current 
prohibitions on having more than one spouse would go away, taking 
with them the incentives those laws provide for formal divorce. 
Instead, unhappily married couples who decide to forgo divorce could 
simply remarry without the fear of being prosecuted for bigamy or 
having a subsequent marriage be declared void. Accordingly, any 
ruling that requires states to recognize polygamy would cause an 
increase in plural marriage—both purposeful plural marriage and 
sequential polygamy, in which a person is legally married to multiple 
people as a result of deciding not to get formally divorced from 
“previous” spouses—and the resulting injury would be significant. As 
discussed below, for those people who elect to become sequential 
polygamists, those harms would be particularly acute, harming both 
current and subsequent spouses and, in the process, undermining the 
states’ substantial “interest in protecting the financial interests of the 
parties at divorce”289 
1. Harms to Initial Spouses.  For current spouses, the most 
significant harms would result from the loss of oversight by the court. 
In other words, for those couples that elect to permanently separate 
but not divorce, the state would lose its opportunity to ensure that the 
couple ends their marriage on terms that are fair and equitable to both 
parties. As discussed earlier, the law does not permit common law 
divorce, and courts will review any settlement agreement between 
divorcing parties for fairness even during formal divorces.290 These 
requirements stem from the law’s awareness that, when left to their 
own devices, divorcing couples may not act in their own economic self-
 
 287. See supra notes 146–48 and accompanying text. 
 288. As outlined earlier, the law has fashioned a number of doctrines designed to avoid such 
results. See supra Part III.B. But those protections are not guaranteed or necessarily sufficient to 
fully protect the subsequent spouse. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 289. In re Marriage of Wisth, 754 N.W.2d 254, 254 (2008). 
 290. See supra Part III.A. 
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interest, which creates too great a possibility that agreements between 
the parties could be the product of coercion or fraud.291 
The removal of the bigamy bar could lead to de facto common law 
divorce wherein separating couples would only have, at best, whatever 
protections given them in settlement agreements. If the state has no 
way of approving these agreements, divorcing parties can be left in a 
precarious financial situation without the state’s knowledge or 
protection. Hardest hit would be those who were already, while 
married, facing financial difficulty.292 Moreover, even fair and equitable 
settlement agreements would be less secure without the enforceability 
of a formal divorce decree.293 
It is true, of course, that simply because a couple does not 
immediately divorce does not mean they will never divorce—some 
simply wait. Such delays can and will take place regardless of how the 
law treats plural marriage. But if polygamy is legalized, such a delay 
could be quite costly because one of the spouses could legally remarry 
before divorcing their first spouse. 
Consider the following hypothetical: Henry marries Catherine and 
the two acquire significant marital property. Henry then deserts 
Catherine and marries Anne, and they too acquire significant marital 
property. With no prohibition on bigamy, Henry’s actions are entirely 
legal. Ten years after Henry’s marriage to Anne, Catherine files for 
divorce. Despite the delay, Catherine will now receive her day in court, 
alleviating some of the concerns raised by plural marriage.294 
Unfortunately, new problems arise. First, there is the question of who 
Catherine must divorce—is she simply divorcing Henry or is this now 
a polygamous marriage amongst all three parties, which would require 
her to file for divorce from both Henry and Anne?295 Once that issue is 
 
 291. See DONALD WITTMAN, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND ORGANIZATION 218 
(2006) (“[T]here is typically a greater emotional bond between a married couple than between 
business partners. The conflict between two people who love each other is likely to be less than 
the conflict between two people with greater self interest.”). 
 292. See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text. 
 293. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 306(e) (NAT’L. CONFERENCE OF 
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, amended 1973) (“Terms of the agreement set forth in the 
decree are enforceable by all remedies available for enforcement of a judgment, including 
contempt, and are enforceable as contract terms.”). 
 294. Namely, the concerns about whether couples come to fair and equitable agreements 
when they divorce. 
 295. For a thoughtful discussion of such practical concerns, see Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating 
Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1959 
(2010) (contrasting “polygamy with aspects of partnership law to derive a set of default rules that 
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resolved, the court and the parties must contend with the question of 
what property Catherine is entitled to. She could only be entitled to the 
property that she and Henry acquired before his marriage to Anne. But 
that approach is unsatisfactory given that her marriage to Henry 
remained legally in effect after Henry married Anne. Traditionally, any 
property acquired by the spouses after marriage and before the entry 
of the divorce decree is subject to division at divorce.296 So Catherine 
could also be entitled to a share of all of the property acquired by 
Henry prior to their formal divorce. But this approach only gives her a 
fractionalized interest in the property that he acquired after marrying 
Anne because Anne, of course, also has an interest in her marital 
property with Henry. In other words, rather than having a one-half 
interest in all the property acquired by her or Henry during the entirety 
of their marriage, Catherine would only have a one-third interest in 
any of the property acquired after Henry married Anne.297 Even if one 
could devise a system for dividing the property equitably, there 
remains the challenge of simply ascertaining when all the property was 
acquired.298 
Further, this dilemma can cause a perverse incentive—if 
Catherine maintains a claim to a percentage of the property that Henry 
acquires with his subsequent spouse, Catherine might be inclined to 
wait as long as possible to file for divorce. This would again undermine 
the states’ interest in encouraging prompt divorces.299 Thus, were 
polygamy legalized, not only would there be a concern for married 
couples who refuse to divorce before marrying others, but there could 
also be financial complications resulting from divorce proceedings that 
are delayed until one spouse has legally married another, third party. 
2. Harms to Subsequent Spouses.  Legalized polygamy would not 
only expose initial spouses to economic harm, but would likewise 
imperil the economic interests of subsequent spouses by eviscerating 
the law’s current protections for those individuals. As the last 
 
might accommodate polygamy’s marital multiplicity”).  
 296. See supra notes 179–80 and accompanying text. 
 297. All of this would again be compounded by the complications associated with who exactly 
Catherine is having to divorce—Henry by himself, or Henry and Anne together.  
 298. Not to mention the problems stemming from such complications as commingling and 
transmutation. See generally J. Thomas Oldham, Tracing, Commingling, and Transmutation, 23 
FAM. L.Q. 219 (1989) (exploring the issues inherent in separating individual property from marital 
property). 
 299. See Taylor, supra note 25, at 467 (“Certainly, there are important reasons for 
encouraging compliance with legal requirements for such dissolution.”). 
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hypothetical illustrates, subsequent spouses would be harmed by any 
system in which couples lose the incentive to divorce. Subsequent 
spouses would always be at risk of having to split what they believe to 
be their exclusive marital property with someone to whom their spouse 
had previously been married, thus subjecting the subsequent spouse to 
reduced financial protection. In some ways, that would be an 
advantage over the current system, which only allows a person to have 
one legal spouse at a time. Under current law, a subsequent, bigamous 
marriage would be void, providing subsequent spouses with no interest 
whatsoever in marital property.300 As noted earlier, however, the law 
has adopted a number of doctrines to protect against this harm: the 
subsequent marriage presumption, the marriage by estoppel doctrine, 
and the putative spouse doctrine.301 Legalizing polygamy, however, 
would essentially eviscerate these protections, putting subsequent 
spouses in a much more precarious financial situation than current law 
permits. 
For instance, the subsequent marriage presumption is driven by 
the current legal reality that a person can only have one spouse, and 
thus presumes the last-in-time spouse to be a person’s legal spouse.302 
Without a numerical limit on spouses, however, the presumption is no 
longer needed. In other words, if a person can have more than one 
spouse, there is no need for a presumption designed to reduce the 
number of possible spouses to just one. Instead, a woman who married 
three men in succession would be considered to have three husbands, 
each having a claim to her estate. If the polygamy is sequential rather 
than concurrent—meaning the wife never intended to have multiple 
husbands but never got a divorce from earlier husbands—the result of 
having the husbands share equally could be particularly harmful to the 
final husband as, in all likelihood, he would be the most dependent on 
the property in question, the first two husbands having already moved 
on and built lives elsewhere.303 
Marriage by estoppel would be equally unnecessary because a 
previously botched divorce would no longer be a bar to the subsequent 
marriage’s validity.304 There would be less incentive for either party to 
 
 300. See RANSFORD C. PYLE & CAROL M. BAST, FOUNDATIONS OF LAW: CASES, 
COMMENTARY AND ETHICS 354 (6th ed. 2016) (defining bigamy as “a crime” and noting that “a 
bigamous marriage is void”). 
 301. See supra Part III.B. 
 302. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 303. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.  
 304. See supra Part III.B.2. 
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a divorce to bring up the fact that one of them failed to properly end a 
previous marriage. After all, doing so could potentially bring an 
additional person (that is, the previous spouse) into the proceedings, 
resulting in the original parties’ receiving a smaller percentage of the 
marital estate.305 
The putative spouse doctrine is the only one of the three that 
would retain some utility given that, regardless of the legality of plural 
marriage, there would still be situations in which a person mistakenly, 
but in good faith, thought he was married to another.306 The doctrine 
would probably be used much less frequently, though, because it is 
typically employed in cases where the subsequent marriage was invalid 
due to one of the parties never having divorced their previous spouse—
a situation that would no longer be an obstacle to the validity of the 
subsequent marriage were polygamy to be legalized. 
In sum, formal, legal divorce protects not only the two former 
spouses but also the subsequent spouses of those individuals. To more 
fully incentivize formal divorce between separating couples, however, 
the states rely on their ability to criminalize bigamy—a tool they would 
be forced to forfeit should polygamy become a constitutional right. In 
the absence of any criminal penalty, separating couples would be more 
likely to choose mutual desertion over divorce, risking not only their 
own economic well-being, but that of their subsequent spouses as well. 
B. A Complete Ban is Necessary To Safeguard the States’ Interest 
As discussed above, legalizing polygamy could very well prompt a 
number of serial monogamists to become sequential polygamists, thus 
exposing both the spouses and the state to significant harm.307 Much of 
that analysis, however, is premised on the assumption that the right to 
engage in polygamy would come with no more restrictions than 
currently attend marriage. Some may argue that the proper limitations 
could greatly ameliorate many of the concerns outlined in this Article, 
so that—if polygamy falls within the fundamental right to marry—the 
states’ objections to plural marriage would be insufficient to justify a 
complete ban. As the Court has made clear, if a state wishes to restrict 
a fundamental right, it must do more than simply prove that it possesses 
a substantial interest; the state must prove that its approach to 
safeguarding that interest does not encroach the constitutional right 
 
 305. See supra notes 296–98 and accompanying text. 
 306. See supra Part III.B.3. 
 307. See supra Part IV.A. 
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any more than necessary.308 In both Zablocki and Turner, for instance, 
the Court struck down state restrictions on marriage because, 
according to the Court, those prohibitions were much broader than 
were necessary to achieve their stated purpose.309 
Accordingly, the question arises as to whether states could impose 
limitations on the right to polygamous marriage that would distinguish 
polygamy from bigamy so as to permit the former (i.e., concurrent 
polygamy) yet prohibit the latter (i.e., sequential polygamy).310 In other 
words, perhaps a state could craft its laws in such a way that polygamy 
is available to those who affirmatively wish to engage in that precise 
practice, yet unavailable to others who attempt to use polygamy merely 
as an excuse to avoid divorce proceedings prior to marrying a 
subsequent spouse. There are two possible ways that the law could 
effectuate that discrete goal. First, the law could condition validity on 
the requirement that parties to an existing marriage must each consent 
to the addition of a subsequent spouse. Second, if adding spouses over 
time is problematic, the law could also require that only unmarried 
individuals enter into a polygamous marriage, essentially resulting in 
the requirement that all parties to a plural marriage must wed in one 
single ceremony. Ultimately, both options fail to safeguard the states’ 
substantial interest in protecting their citizens. 
1. Gradual Polygamy with Consent.  Returning to the parties in the 
previous hypotheticals, assume that Henry marries Catherine and the 
two later decide to expand into a polygamous marriage. The two meet 
Anne, and everyone agrees that Anne should join the marriage. In 
order to accommodate such situations while also minimizing the 
potential for sequential polygamy, the law could condition legal 
sanction of a polygamous marriage on the consent of all parties to the 
marriage. Unfortunately, though, the ex ante consequences of this 
scheme are problematic. 
Allowing a married couple to agree to add another spouse to the 
marriage gives rise to concerns about duress and coercion. One way to 
understand these concerns is to examine courts’ existing suspicion of 
postnuptial agreements, which itself parallels courts’ skepticism of 
 
 308. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 309. See supra notes 109, 116–17 and accompanying text. 
 310. As noted earlier, some have already attempted to distinguish the two terms. See supra 
note 31 and accompanying text. The issue becomes, however, whether the state could adopt 
meaningful distinctions that would permit one practice while prohibiting the other. 
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settlement311 and prenuptial agreements.312 Like a prenuptial 
agreement, a postnuptial agreement “is an agreement that determines 
a couple’s rights and obligations upon divorce,”313 but the difference is 
that the parties enter into the agreement after already having been 
married.314 Given the timing, the courts are quite suspicious of such 
agreements—even more so than they are of prenuptial and settlement 
agreements. As one court explained: 
  A [postnuptial] agreement stands on a different footing from both 
a premarital and a separation agreement. Before marriage, the parties 
have greater freedom to reject an unsatisfactory premarital contract. 
. . . 
  A separation agreement, in turn, is negotiated when a marriage 
has failed and the spouses “intend a permanent separation or marital 
dissolution.” . . . The family unit will no longer be kept intact, and the 
parties may look to their own future economic interests. . . . The 
circumstances surrounding [postnuptial] agreements in contrast are 
“pregnant with the opportunity for one party to use the threat of 
dissolution ‘to bargain themselves into positions of advantage.’”315  
Stated differently, there is a fear that a person may threaten to divorce 
his spouse unless she agrees to sign a postnuptial agreement and the 
spouse—determined to preserve her marriage, or at least the benefits 
flowing from that marriage—may be willing to agree to almost 
anything, including an agreement that is contrary to her best 
interests.316 After all, “[w]hile it is lawful and not against public policy 
for husband and wife to enter into such contracts, . . . they are not 
dealing with each other as strangers at arm’s length.”317 
 
 311. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 312. See supra notes 184–86 and accompanying text. 
 313. Sean Hannon Williams, Postnuptial Agreements, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 827, 828 (2007). 
 314. See SHARON THOMPSON, PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS AND THE PRESUMPTION OF FREE 
CHOICE: ISSUES OF POWER IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 91 (2015) (distinguishing “unmarried 
parties entering prenups” from “married parties entering postnuptial agreements”). 
 315. Ansin v. Craven-Ansin, 929 N.E.2d 955, 962–63 (Mass. 2010) (footnote omitted) (quoting 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 
7.01(1)(c), at 946 (AM. LAW INST. 2002); then quoting Pacelli v. Pacelli, 725 A.2d 56, 62 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999)).  
 316. See Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for 
Egalitarian Marriage?, 84 VA. L. REV. 509, 603–04 (1998) (discussing how “divorce threat” may 
prompt one spouse to strike a “disadvantageous bargain out of a self-interested fear of 
defection”). 
 317. In re Estate of Gab, 364 N.W.2d 924, 926 (S.D. 1985) (quoting Keith v. Keith, 156 N.W. 
910, 911 (S.D. 1916)). 
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For the foregoing reasons, postnuptial agreements are thus subject 
to increased scrutiny.318 As with prenuptial and settlement agreements, 
courts review postnuptial agreements closely for fairness and 
equitability. As one court explained: 
Although we agree with the defendant that principles of contract law 
generally apply in determining the enforceability of a postnuptial 
agreement, we conclude that postnuptial agreements are subject to 
special scrutiny and the terms of such agreements must be both fair 
and equitable at the time of execution and not unconscionable at the 
time of dissolution.319 
The concerns that animate the courts’ treatment of postnuptial 
agreements mirror the issues presented by allowing spouses to consent 
to plural marriage and should militate against allowing married couples 
to agree to add additional spouses to an existing marriage. For true 
polygamists who desire an active plural marriage, these concerns may 
be minimal, but concerns are much more grave for sequential 
bigamists. Consider an individual who previously separated from his 
spouse but now wishes to remarry. If polygamy were permitted with 
the permission of the current spouse, divorce is not necessary to enable 
the “nonpolygamist” to remarry; instead, he simply has to get his 
existing spouse to consent. That consent could be acquired through 
negotiation, although perhaps to the detriment of the first spouse. As 
the courts are concerned with the bargaining chips used to secure a 
postnuptial agreement, then, they should likewise be concerned with 
those used to secure an agreement to add an additional spouse to an 
existing marriage. 
Again, in a legal scheme that allows polygamy with the consent of 
existing spouses, plural marriage would be available to all citizens, 
including purposefully polygamous couples and sequentially bigamous 
couples. The latter, however, could use this option simply to avoid 
divorce and any resulting financial liabilities. Compare the following 
hypothetical to the one that began this section: Henry marries 
Catherine, but later decides he would prefer to have Anne as his wife. 
Catherine is in poor health and is worried that a divorce will leave her 
without health insurance, which she receives through Henry’s 
 
 318. Id. at 925. 
 319. Bedrick v. Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17, 23 (Conn. 2011); see also THOMPSON, supra note 314, at 
91 (“[M]arital property agreements entered into by spouses (for example postnuptial or 
separation agreements) are subjected to a much higher level of scrutiny [given that] the parties 
are not ordinary business partners.”). 
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employer as his spouse. Henry, concerned about the financial 
implications of divorcing Catherine, tells her that, if she consents to his 
marriage to Anne, he need not divorce Catherine and she can continue 
to enjoy his health benefits. He further agrees to rent an apartment for 
her and to give her a small allowance each month. Though Catherine 
would have received significantly more as part of a divorce action, she 
agrees to Henry’s terms. Catherine is accordingly harmed by accepting 
Henry’s offer in lieu of filing for divorce. Further, as noted earlier, 
should she later change her mind and file for divorce, Anne is now also 
a legal spouse to the marriage and, as such, would likely have some 
claim to at least some of the marital property, thus resulting in a 
diminution of Catherine’s share.320 
So while consent may seem a good way to mitigate some of the 
concerns over plural marriage, those who have no interest in true 
polygamy could nonetheless take advantage of the consent provision 
to evade the divorce requirement. Spouses in Catherine’s position 
would be once again exposed to the potential for extreme financial 
harm. Thus, when considering the prisoner’s dilemma that can arise in 
the marital context, the law must be mindful of not only the coercion 
that exists between the two prisoners and the state, but also the 
coercion that might arise between two “prisoners” who, unlike those 
in the traditional hypothetical, are allowed to communicate with one 
another.321 
Of course, simply because a court should be skeptical of certain 
kinds of agreements does not mean that those agreements should be 
illegal. Courts are skeptical of postnuptial agreements, but most states 
still permit couples to enter into them.322 In theory, states could wait to 
grant a plural marriage license until the consent agreement has been 
carefully reviewed for coercion and duress, but two problems still 
remain. First, there is the basic question of whether any polygamous 
marriage is truly consensual.323 Second, even if a court could discern 
 
 320. See supra notes 296–98 and accompanying text. One could perhaps argue that the 
awareness of these resulting penalties would provide new incentives to divorce, but “[f]rustration 
of an individual’s reasonable economic expectations, which will often result in increasing the 
already crowded welfare rolls, is not the most appropriate method” of incentivizing divorce. 
Taylor, supra note 25, at 467. Given the states’ interest in safeguarding the economic security of 
their citizens, this seems an insufficient protection.  
 321. See Susan S. Kuo & Benjamin Means, Collective Coercion, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1599, 1610–
11 (2016) (describing the prisoner’s dilemma as a collective coercion problem).  
 322. See supra notes 313–19. 
 323. See Davis, supra note 295, at 2008 (recognizing “the difficulty of discerning consent and 
the fear of duress or other more subtle forms of coercion”); Laurie Shrage, Polygamy, Privacy, 
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whether a polygamy agreement was truly consensual, such 
adjudication would typically not happen until some indeterminate time 
in the future—the point at which one of the original signatories raises 
lack of consent as a defense. With premarital and postmarital 
agreements, for example, a court generally is not called upon to 
determine their validity until one of the parties has died or the couple 
is divorcing. The same would be true of a postmarital polygamy 
agreement—there would likely be no question until one of the parties 
sought to either enforce the agreement or have it declared invalid. By 
then, enough time would have potentially passed that sorting out the 
property interests of the multiple parties would be enormously 
difficult, if not impossible.324 After all, the parties to the marriage may 
have joined at various times and via various polygamy agreements—
some valid and some not—with the result that some members of the 
purported plural marriage are legally married to one, but not all, of the 
individuals comprising the intended group. And, of course, for those 
who attempted to join the marriage by way of a polygamy agreement 
that was subsequently found to be coercive, their entry into the 
“marriage” would presumably be invalid, leaving them without the 
vital protections of state marriage law. 
2. Instant and Complete Polygamy.  States could also permit 
polygamy on the condition that polygamous marriages can only be 
entered into by people who are currently single. In other words, the 
law would require all parties to the plural marriage to be married at 
one time, in a single wedding ceremony. Thus, returning to our 
hypothetical, if Henry wants to be married simultaneously to both 
Catherine and Anne, then instead of adding Anne at a later date, all 
three parties would have to be currently unmarried and would have to 
wed at the same time. Doing so would help ameliorate—although 
certainly not eradicate—the concern that a spouse could be coerced 
into adding another spouse to an existing marriage. Nonetheless, this 
alternative solution is also problematic. 
As an initial matter, most polygamists would likely consider this 
requirement incompatible with the traditional practice of polygamy. 
 
and Equality, in AFTER MARRIAGE: RETHINKING MARITAL RELATIONSHIPS 160, 178 n.28 
(Elizabeth Brake ed., 2016) (conceding that, when it comes to polygamy, “judging genuine 
consent is likely to be difficult”).  
 324. Of course, even if the polygamous marriage were upheld, the question of how property 
would be distributed at divorce is far from certain. See Davis, supra note 295, at 1990 (noting that, 
with polygamy, “the division of spousal property at divorce will be uncertain”). 
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Typically, “polygamists do not present themselves as a complete(d) 
‘group’ when they marry, but rather contemplate adding spouses 
serially.”325 
Beyond this practical concern, a requirement that polygamous 
marriage can only be sanctioned if the parties marry in a single mass 
ceremony would likely result in polygamists adopting one of two 
responses, both of which pose dangerous consequences. First, current 
spouses would simply divorce and remarry whenever they wanted to 
add an additional spouse. For instance, if Henry were married to 
Catherine but wanted to add Anne to the marriage, he and Catherine 
would first need to divorce and then enter into a new marriage 
involving all three spouses. Given the complexities and time 
commitment involved in divorce proceedings, it is doubtful many 
couples would elect to go to all that trouble each time a new spouse 
was added. More importantly, as discussed earlier, states only wish to 
promote divorce as an alternative to desertion.326 States would prefer 
for couples who want to be married to maintain that status;327 any 
divorce, even if for a short period of time, leaves the parties without 
the protections of marriage, exposing them to potential harm for as 
long as they remain unmarried, which is especially dangerous if they 
are unable to remarry as planned.328 
Given the complexity and time commitment involved in divorce 
proceedings, individuals seeking to create a polygamous marriage 
would likely wait until all, or at least most, of the desired spouses had 
been identified and assembled before entering into a legal polygamous 
marriage. This approach presents a new, but even more significant, 
harm: the earlier partners would have to wait some time before getting 
 
 325. Id. at 2007. Therefore, polygamous unions complicate the traditional notion of when a 
marriage begins and ends. Id. at 1989. Spouses are usually added serially to polygamous marriages 
for financial reasons: at the start of a marriage, there is likely some uncertainty about how many 
spouses the marriage can support, but as the family’s wealth grows over time, so too does the 
ability to support additional spouses. See Witte, supra note 65, at 18. Additionally, in many 
cultures, as the original parties to the marriage age, younger wives are added to replace the lost 
fertility of older wives. Bennion, supra note 75, at 104  
 326. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 327. See Mark Strasser, Family, Same-Sex Unions, and the Law, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK 
OF FAMILY LAW AND POLICY 45, 59 (John Eekelaar & Rob George eds., 2014) (noting the states’ 
interest in the “continuation of marriage”).  
 328. This outcome of this hypothetical situation—that the law incentivizes temporary 
divorce—has really occurred as a byproduct of tax law. See Daniel J. Lathrope, State-Defined 
Marital Status: Its Future as an Operative Tax Factor, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 257, 263 (1983) 
(“Temporary divorces have been undertaken for tax reasons and temporary marriages have been 
suggested as a tax planning strategy for the unmarried.”).  
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married and would be without the benefits and protections afforded by 
legal marriage for that interim period. Again, this puts those 
individuals at risk should something happen that ultimately prevents 
them from ever marrying. Ultimately, this result undermines policies a 
state may have established to incentivize individuals to marry promptly 
in order to protect their financial security.329 
A requirement that any polygamous marriage take place all at 
once is, at best, likely unworkable and, at worst, an incentive to delay 
marriage until all the eventual spouses are assembled. Such a delay—
which, should the anticipated marriage never take place, would be 
eternal—can prove devastating to those who spent years in a 
relationship devoid of the legal safeguards marriage affords. After all, 
marriage offers much greater protections to those who are financially 
dependent on an intimate partner—as those in many polygamous 
relationships tend to be330—than mere cohabitation.331 
Clearly, perverse incentives arise from both possible 
accommodations that states could make to simultaneously permit 
purposeful concurrent polygamy and prohibit sequential bigamy. 
These possible accommodations contravene individuals’ best interests 
and the interests of the state. For purposes of satisfying strict scrutiny, 
then, a complete ban on polygamy is already narrowly tailored. Any 
attempt to carve out an exception for those who truly wish to engage 
in concurrent polygamy has too many attendant detriments to make it 
an actual solution. 
 
 329. See Kohm, supra note 207, at 1246 (“Without marriage, those who live together until 
death do not receive these automatic estate-planning benefits and are left vulnerable to a great 
deal of problems.”).  
 330. See Janet Bennion, History, Culture, and Variability of Mormon Schismatic Groups, in 
MODERN POLYGAMY IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORICAL, CULTURAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES 
101, 113 (Cardell K. Jacobson & Lara Burton eds., 2011) (describing women within the FLDS 
community as being “isolated, financially dependent, [and] uneducated”). 
 331. Elizabeth S. Scott, Domestic Partnerships, Implied Contracts, and Law Reform, in 
RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF 
THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 331, 332 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006) (“[I]nformal 
unions . . . provide uncertain protection to financially dependent family members because the 
right to a share of property and support is legally established only after the relationship ends. In 
contrast, marriage is a status based on registration under which rights and obligations attach at 
the outset with the exchange of vows.”). 
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CONCLUSION 
In light of society’s increasing acceptance of nontraditional 
families,332 polygamy is “no longer relegated to the hidden cultish 
confines of southern border towns and western desert wastelands.”333 
This change in perception, coupled with the legalization of same sex 
marriage, has brought to light the question whether, under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, polygamy might 
likewise fall within the fundamental right to marriage. This Article 
argues, however, that the answer to that question is largely irrelevant. 
The crucial issue is instead whether—even if polygamy were included 
within that right—the states nonetheless have a compelling 
justification for continuing their refusal to recognize plural marriage. 
This Article answers that in the affirmative: yes, states do have such an 
interest, and it is the promotion of divorce. Not the promotion of 
divorce at the expense of marriage, but the promotion of divorce over 
the alternative of desertion. 
The state’s interest in protecting families and individuals’ financial 
interests forces it to both encourage marriage and, should those 
marriages end, incentivize formal divorce. But legalizing polygamy 
deprives the state of one of its most powerful incentives for divorce: 
the prohibition on being married to more than one person at a time 
and the subsequent inability to remarry without first divorcing an 
existing spouse. Without that incentive, separating couples will face a 
full-fledged prisoner’s dilemma between electing for formal divorce 
and simply going their separate ways. More specifically, if polygamy 
becomes legal, remarriage while still legally married to someone else 
likewise becomes permissible. In such a society, spouses might—in 
light of the costs associated with divorce—be more tempted to simply 
end their marriages informally, to the great detriment of not only the 
parties to that marriage but those whom the parties may subsequently 
wed. Particularly at risk here are the poor, who are much less 
 
 332. Marissa J. Holob, Respecting Commitment: A Proposal to Prevent Legal Barriers from 
Obstructing the Effectuation of Intestate Goals, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1492, 1510 (2000) (noting 
the “growing acceptance and proliferation of nontraditional families”); see also Elizabeth S. Scott 
& Robert E. Scott, From Contract to Status: Collaboration and the Evolution of Novel Family 
Relationships, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 293, 297 (2015) (“Some observers suggest that even 
polygamous relationships are becoming ‘normalized,’ pointing to the popularity of the television 
series Big Love and Sister Wives.”). 
 333. BENNION, supra note 75, at 3. 
HIGDON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/25/2017  11:59 AM 
2017] POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGE 143 
susceptible to the other, property-based incentives to divorce. To 
protect those vulnerable parties who need the protections guaranteed 
by formal marriage and, correspondingly, formal divorce, the states 
thus have a compelling interest in continuing to prohibit polygamy in 
any form. 
